España no sera rica mientras sus rios desemboquen en el mar

Julio Alvarez Mendizabal, Spanish premier, 1835 (Spain won't be rich as long as its rivers flow into the sea)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Transferring water from the Rhone to Barcelona is an exciting project which stirs our imagination twice : the aqueduct Languedoc - Roussillon - Catalogne (LRC) extends our vision of progress, where Mediterranean hydraulics have long had prominent standing, from the Roman bridge on the Gard to the Suez canal ; and it conveys a new solidarity between neighbouring Nations, on what is most essential to life. Yet, reality is as usual less poetic, and such a costly project has to be justified economically as well as environmentally. And of course, before going ahead, one must check whether there are any cheaper and more modest solutions to Barcelona's water scarcity. Clearly the Rhone is a huge Alpine river, and is by far the largest flowing into the Mediterranean ; but there's also a lot of water flowing down from the much closer Pyrenees into the Ebro ; the western part of Catalonia is part of the Ebro basin, and its river Segre, born in France, borders the basin of the Llobregat flowing directly from the mountains down to Barcelona. Why can't the regional water supply of Barcelona area, Aigües Ter Llobregat (ATLL) purchase some water to its nearest neighbour, the Ebro hydrographic Confederation ? The rumour has spread that all Ebro’s water was already allotted, and that it would be impossible to take back the water of the oldest State irrigation project in Spain ; worse, "Zaragoza"1 and even "Madrid" would particularly refuse to give a drop of the precious liquid to the head city of Catalonia. It would then be out of frustration that Barcelona, the largest harbour of the Mediterranean, would buy in France rather than beg in Madrid for a resource able to match its glorious future economic development. The French partners on their side claim that they want to send water for historical solidarity reasons between Languedoc and Catalonia2. From a European perspective, it certainly would be better to found the project on solid economic grounds than on symbolic and ideological arguments which in fact carry outdated rivalries and resentment (Barcelona would be closer to France and Europe than from the rest of Spain). By the way there are also frustrations in France today : the LRC project already has aroused negative reactions from French farmers and some political parties in Languedoc, and once under construction, it might arouse other jealousies around Toulouse, which is closer from Montpellier than Barcelona, and with a much lower pass to go through. In the Toulouse area, there is a dispute about the opportunity to build an extra reservoir in Charlas, so as to increase the low summer flows and indirectly to alleviate the present over-exploitation of water by irrigation. Rhone water would be providential to bypass this dispute. But then later why not serve Genoa in Italy, which is also closer from the Rhone than Barcelona and has water problems ? And in case the Barcelona aqueduct wouldn’t be profitable extend it to Malaga ? Today, all these transfers are technically quite feasible, and even London is closer to the Rhone than Los Angeles is from Colorado. And a century ago, French engineers designed a transfer from Geneva lake to Paris 3. Besides there are 1

Zaragoza is the head city of Aragon, which is almost entirely in the Ebro basin, and which has always claimed its priority on the vital resource, even though the Ebro basin is in fact shared by 8 autonomous regions of Spain. 2 In early Middle Ages, Languedoc was a large part of Southern France including Toulouse, where people used the word ‘oc’ to say yes, while in Northern France they used ‘oil’. It was part of the Wisigothic kingdom, which extended down to Valencia in Spain. Today, people who live in France south of Perpignan largely speak Catalan. 3 After renewed debates from 1890 till 1920, the project was abandoned, because the decision to filter and chlorinate water from all origins, even the far but clean sources, gave a decisive advantage to river intakes next to the city.

already many interregional water transfers in operation and other international ones under study in Europe. Upon the report of its Spanish member Juan de Dios Izquierdo Collado, the European Parliament has voted a motion in favour of a systematic study of existing and potential transfers, in the prospect of making a European water grid 4. The LRC link would be the first of a series allowing in the end to transfer "water that floods in the north towards arid lands in the south". Beyond the hydrological ignorance which sustains such a naive and generous idea, there is a clear need for a global reflection on water transfers, and that is what an independent network of researchers on water policy has wished to initiate. Of course environmental impact and other technical studies are being developed by the proponents of the project on both sides of the Perthus pass5, under the supervision of scientific committees. But for us the major issue is not a potential negative impact of the project on the environment on the French or on the Catalan sides. Clearly, sustainability means to consider the demand side of the question. The LRC project is a perfect case to put in practice the Brundtland report on sustainable development : think globally, act locally. Think globally ? Conversely to a common opinion carried by the media, Spain is not a waterpoor country by European standards, in particular in per capita water availability. Typical irregularity of river flows is compensated partly by an impressive set of embalses (reservoirs) which have been systematically developed by engineers. However, Spain has long based its economic development on irrigated agriculture, as summarised in the fascinating above epigraph : today around 80% of abstracted water (and a still bigger fraction in the summer) is used by agriculture, and most observers contend that in that particular use it is both massively evaporated and wasted since under-priced. Saving a little bit of irrigation water then liberates a lot for other uses where the economic value of water is far greater. The XXIst century will have to face the issue of unsustainable irrigation, and one must really check the validity of inter-basin transfers if they support an unsustainable development model. Precisely, those forecast in the Spanish National Hydrological Plan (1993) are hotly debated with downstream Portugal, and within Spain between autonomous regions. Even though the Rhone transfer might alleviate the issue, doesn’t it indirectly support an unsustainable model of water use, by postponing the time for a ‘new deal’ between irrigation and other water uses ? Act locally ? But does Barcelona really need to import water from so far ? Can’t the city first organise the local demands management, so as to reach a dynamic equilibrium between supply and demand which would be much more profitable ? From our rough knowledge of demographic and also per capita potable water demand evolution in European cities, it’s quite obvious that the basic water demand forecasts for Barcelona are dubious, and should carefully be checked 6.

4

A report was indeed made, but it was a very partial and lazy job, since it completely forgot to study the many transfer projects which are at a stop for failing to pay for themselves. 5 Société d'Etudes pour l'Aqueduc LRC, SEPA LRC on the French side, and ALRC-ATLL on the Catalan side. SEPA is a subsidiary at 50 % of the Compagnie du Bas-Rhone Languedoc (BRL) and of 9 powerful groups including the 3 Water supply majors, the Caisse des Dépots, Electricité de France, GEC-Alstom, two pipe manufacturers, etc. 6 In fact, I initially was part of the scientific committee set up by the French partner SEPA. I started questioning the project from the documents I had received for the first meeting in October 1997. Since I couldn’t obtain that water demands would be studied by the French party (if they buy the water, do we care), I asked my European colleagues to check them, but I personally did not take a direct part in the review.

We then have wished to make a quick and low cost European review of Barcelona’s region socio-economic situation concerning water, and of the possible problem solutions. Thanks to the financial support of the French Direction de l’Eau, we’ve set up an original partnership : a first phase consisted to ex-plain the water demand situation in the Catalan metropolis and in the region. It’s obviously been realised by Catalan and Spanish colleagues, including the French specialist of Iberian peninsula water policies. Then a second phase has gathered several expert analyses from non Spanish and non French European colleagues, who could cross-compare with the evolution of water demands and related issues in their own countries. Of course, despite its size and international character, this LRC aqueduct is by no means unique, and there is a lot of expertise all around Europe ready to be transferred to decision makers. Surprisingly enough, our colleagues all presented cases of abandoned or questioned water transfers, including in Northern Europe. For instance, a project to supply Copenhagen with Swedish water across the Sund has been abandoned ; another transfer from Albania to Puglia across the Otrante canal can’t find its subsidies (both projects are much cheaper than LRC) ; and the projected British national water grid linking Scotland and Wales to the SouthEast is now subordinated to the first global reduction of supply pipes leaks by water companies. We started our reflection from demography and water demands in Barcelona area, and in particular in the area served by ATLL. Then the scope was extended to Catalonia, and further to similar situations in Europe. Phase 1 consisted in getting answers to 5 basic questions : 1) Aren’t demographic forecasts at the root of water demand prospects over-optimistic ? 2) What are the reasonable per capita water demand trends ? How long will the presently noticeable downward trend go on, is it structural or temporary ? 3) Presently drinking water is abstracted from the polluted Llobregat whose mouth is next to Barcelona on the west, and from the Ter which runs into the sea further North-East in the Costa Brava. Since the project aims at substituting the Rhone transfer to Llobregat abstractions, the question is whether the Llobregat quality can be improved, or if it should be abandoned. In particular, it is contaminated by runoff from abandoned rock salt mines upstream, and this is a typical old industrial site situation ; but it’s difficult to decide whether there will always be a natural salt content in the river tributaries. Anyway, depollute and desalinate the Llobregat is a European Directives’ requirement of a higher order, so that in the end, keeping the Llobregat as an abstraction point may be the obvious solution, exactly as the Seine and the Marne will remain the natural abstraction sources for Paris, with programs to upgrade river quality and sophisticate the drinking water plants 7. Besides the AGBAR company, now a subsidiary of Lyonnaise des Eaux, which has a still long term concession to distribute water to down town Barcelona (3/4 of total population in ATLL serviced region), has its own potabilisation plant close to the City, in the Llobregat delta, and it uses the delta aquifer as a temporary storage capacity. Couldn’t this practice be developed, and wouldn’t it be cheaper for the city to ‘purchase’ a sustainable management of the delta aquifer’s quality ? Can’t they also recycle part of the waste water for second order uses (parks, toilets of large hotels, etc.) ?

7

A few years ago, the City of Paris had a project to build an extra upstream reservoir and to tap it all the way to Paris, but the project was discarded because it was not economically profitable for the sole needs of the city. Water users of the upstream basin preferred to bet on the success of depollution investments which are required by the Urban Waste Water Directive and others.

4) If we enlarge one step further the territory of water demand management studies, one must consider the eventual water availability next to the two basins where Barcelona is now taking its water. Everybody then thinks of the Ebro delta, because there is an existing water transfer to the city of Tarragona, which is half-way to Barcelona. Extending the existing pipe would obviously be cheaper. But this solution is generally discarded, because the river is already so over-exploited that the delta is shrinking. However, this reduced debate between Ebro and Rhone allows to mask that there is a relatively important tributary of the Ebro, the Segre, which has its springs in French Cerdagne, and which flows all along the basin of the Llobregat and of its tributary, the Cardener. In at least two locations, it is no further than 30 km, eleven times less than Montpellier is from the ATLL drinking water plant in Cardedeu. One can then wonder why this solution is not considered. How is the water stored in several reservoirs built on the Segre allotted ? and since there is a very large reservoir under construction in Rialp (400 Hm3 nominal capacity, able to provide 1100 Hm3/yr), how is its water allotted ? Is it all for more irrigation, even though the Lerida area in western Catalonia is one of the most ancient and efficient irrigation areas in the country ? Which price will it pay for that extra water ? And given the extreme difference in price with urban drinking water, couldn’t priority be left to urban needs for a small percentage of the water ? As is the universal rule in the world, granting priority to potable water on all other uses ? 5) This leads then to a legal issue : the project’s proponents have claimed that all the Ebro basin water was already and for ever allotted to various abstraction licence (concession) holders. This is not in line with the official regime under the Spanish 1985 law. But what is the existing concessions management practice, and how much would cost the compensations associated with the flexibilisation in favour drinking water needs ? 8 Four experts were approached to answer these 5 questions. The first one on demography and migrations in Catalonia, Francesc Magrinya could easily synthesise an answer, from the official demographic studies he gathered in his recent prospective analysis of mobility and traffic evolution in the metropolitan area. As concerns present and future potable water uses in the ATLL service area, as well as local alternatives to Rhone water transfer (questions 2 and 3), Josep Vergés, an independent economist, author of an interesting book An economic policy for water, to comment on available data and forecasts. The author is known for his liberal positions, but here he basically presents the facts. The fourth question was the most difficult to cover, probably because it’s one of the most sensitive policy issues in Spain : indirect subsidies to agriculture through very cheap water. Surface water for irrigation is delivered at an average price of 1 Pta/m3 or 0.6 cents of Euro. Since Spanish colleagues felt obliged to keep a civil servant’s reserve, Michel Drain, a French geographer specialist of water and irrigation in the Iberian peninsula, covered that particular issue. He’s the one who brought to our attention the Rialp reservoir under construction, which was hardly ever mentioned in Catalonia.

8

With the severe droughts in 1989-1991, in the French Adour-Garonne basin, it was decided that EdF would enhance the late summer low flows with the water stored in its hydro-electric reservoirs, which was sold at a price corresponding to opportunity cost. This solution is cheaper than building new reservoirs, and of course more flexible. Besides it allows for a learning process among rural water users about the cost of water, and about economically inefficient infrastructures.

The last question was covered by professor of civil law Esperanza Alcaín Martinez, specialist of water law in Spain. She indicated that Spanish water law provides several ways for a change of ending and even of on-going concession rights by the administration, with due compensation. What we don’t know yet is the amount of compensations given in practice to the previous right holder, when a concession is changed. Anyway the central Spanish government, who is responsible for the Ebro confederation (being an inter-regional confederation), has legal possibilities to let the water in the Segre reservoirs be transferred to Barcelona temporarily in case of drought, since drinking water has priority on all other water uses. The second part of this report corresponds to the second phase, and proposes European comments. It starts with an Italian questioning of large hydraulic infrastructures, which is all the more interesting that Italy is largely in the same situation as Spain concerning water demands, with the largest share taken by irrigation. Long distance transfers for water supply is increasingly abandoned and replaced by more qualitative and localised water management, based on reconsidering future demands downwards. This contribution by MM. Mangano (former manager of Rome’s water supply) and Massarutto (water economics and policy professor in Udine university), is followed by Thomas Zabel’s, from the British Water Research centre close to London : he also shows how water policy has changed to demandside (economies, leaks reduction), for the sake of postponing costly investments like the national grid. Then Mikael Skou Andersen, water policy specialist in CESAM centre, Århus university, analyses the Danish approach to curb water demands, which led to abandon the projected transfer from Sweden. Lastly, Erik Mostert, researcher in River Basin Administration centre, Delft Technical University, not only presents the debates on transfers in the Netherlands, but recalls that a European Directive subjects this kind of projects to an European impact statement, which in his opinion should be prepared by a more systematic study, the methodology of which he proposes. In an extended analysis, the French and the Germans could also provide other examples, like the abandoned long distance transfer from a projected new and 4th reservoir upstream Paris, which were both discarded by the whole water policy community at the time Jacques Chirac was mayor. Now that water demands in the capital have gone down by 20% since 1990, the decision not to build has proved wise. In southern Germany, the water carrier from the Bodensee is now in crisis, because demand reduction push the share holders to withdraw at the end of the concession. Now, how can we summarise the findings of this first screening ? May be the most surprising one is that Barcelona doesn’t need the Rhone transfer : population will certainly not grow according to the over-optimistic planners’ forecasts at the time of the Olympic games, even if the current regional plan, seeking to re-equilibrate economic development in favour of the rest of Catalonia, is not implemented. Per capita water demand is going down, as it is in most large cities in Europe. Barcelona’s consumption is above the average, so that there probably exists a serious potential for decreasing water demand. Even if the downward trend were due to the economic crisis, demand would not go up again to previous levels, because large industrial water users and services have structurally changed their consumption patterns. ATLL is particularly hit by this evolution, even though its managers fail to see that industry is increasingly quitting the large hydraulics surface water supply systems to turn to groundwater sources, always neglected by planners. In fact, the best strategy is to protect aquifers close to cities. They constitute natural reservoirs with no evaporation. Re-infiltration of good quality water increases the advantages of the solution, as experienced by the Netherlands, California, Paris suburbs ... Another very important source of fresh water is the outflows of the efficient sewage works under construction, at least for low quality water uses.

Even if these local solutions are not accepted, the need for water is only temporary, i.e. the 10-year drought. In this situation, rather than investing in an irreversible solution which forces to use lots of water to justify the very high fixed costs, it would be much better to set up ‘security connections’ between Barcelona and the Ebro basin in one or two locations (firstly link Segre-Cardener at the level of Rialp or even further upstream, second extend the existing transfer Ebro-Tarragona to Barcelona), so as to exchange water with farmers in the western part of Catalonia, in particular in the Lerida area where they are well organised. In particular, they would obtain generous compensations for exceptional water transfers to Barcelona in case of drought, and it would indeed be a positive sum game. Spanish 1985 law is quite clear and should allow it : there can be no more permanent concessions, and drinking water has priority over all other uses, as is the case everywhere in Europe. So that both from legal and economic points of view, if Barcelona needs water, it is obvious that it’s in the Segre that it must look for it. This way of thinking is in line with the Framework Directive in preparation, even though it’s still very shy on the water quantities issue : one should first look for in-basin solutions, and then look for neighbouring basins etc. Even though the French partners spend a lot of time arguing that the Rhone water can’t be for agriculture in Spain, the LRC project indirectly releases water for an ever extending irrigated agriculture, which is increasingly considered as unsustainable ; political acceptability on the French side may imply a contagion of under-priced water for irrigation ; and some already think in secret that LRC will be furthered south of the Ebro towards Murcia, a region which was promised to receive Ebro water in the dead born National Hydrological Plan. The worse would be that the project finally could be built only with European subsidies, and thanks to the high rateable value of Barcelona : there are of course much more useful projects to subsidise, even though they carry less symbols, in particular the local water projects we have considered, but also several railroad tunnels to develop rail routing of lorries. This should indeed be priority n°1 concerning European size systems. The design of the LRC project offers a very good example of the traditional characteristics of water policy in Spain, in France and in Europe : a quasi-complete separation between political decision makers, who monopolise the formulation of Demands, and water engineers who monopolise the expertise on supply technologies. But, as some American water policy analysts say with humour, it’s time to shift from ‘hydrodinosaurs’ to hydrodiplomacy, based on the reasonable sharing of water between users. This implies developing bottom up contractual approaches, which some identify with water markets 9. An October 1999 Spanish law allows concession rights holders to sell their rights to users in equal or superior order of priority. Water markets have been invented in western United states, within the ‘conservative revolution’, on the basis of the specific water law prevailing in the arid south-west part, called prior appropriation ; this is a ‘far West’ practice which hopefully does not exist in Europe, where it is the use of water that is regulated by law, not its ownership 10. However, some economists, fascinated by the potential rationalisation of markets, fail to see the complexity of 9

Contracts do not necessarily involve markets, and by the way, what is perverse with LRC is that it appears like a grandiose contract in a continent where the Union supports the generalisation of contractual policies. If it could carry out a big contract between Spain and France, the presidence of the Generalitat de Catalonia would give itself a modernist image, but in fact it would pursue a traditional top down ‘planning of real needs’ within Catalonia, and condemn contracts between local water users, and more efficient water allocations. 10 Across member States, European water law is reducing or suppressing private ownership, and moves towards a balance between demanialised waters owned by the government, and common property waters held in trust by governments which only warrant that sharing between users remains equitable and democratic.

water as a ressource, and consider international water transfers like LRC in a simplistic manner as a good test illustrating economic theory within global markets. But, doing this, they do only part time economics, since they forget to include in the market the principal water user by far, irrigated agriculture. They also forget that implementing markets first needs to have a national water grid to carry water away, and this one has to be heavily subsidised by government, otherwise no one would buy the water ! Anyway, in a fixed costs industry like water supply, a large transfer can only be justified by a large real water demand, otherwise the internal rates of return are too low ; so that Barcelona can certainly find cheaper water closer if the needs aren’t so great. The following pages tend to show that it’s the case, and that the LRC project is not a sustainable project. But we admit that our study is a light one, and our conclusive proposal is to suggest a decision making process based on collective learning between stake holders (decision makers, water experts and users representatives). It is in that bottom up spirit that a ‘hybrid forum’ mixing the policy and the technical debates should be organised prior to the signature of a treaty between France and Spain. Northern Europeans have reasons to be proud of the Rhine commission, where they indeed have abandoned a traditional sovereignty standing, so as to develop contractual and basin- rational solutions ; so why don’t we take example on it for Southern European water policy ? One of the indirect findings of our study is that there is a need for a European expertise, the independence of which would be based on the confrontation of Catalan, Spanish French, Italian, Portuguese, and Northern European, American points of view ; it should be based on economic, legal, sociological, geography and historical expertise as much, if not more, as on engineering expertise. We think it is not the case presently with the 2 scientific committees set up by the proponents of the project: they do a good job on the environmental impacts, but a partial expertise bears the risk of being trapped in the justification of a pre-conceived project with no real alternative, which in the end might not be futuristic, but outdated by one century. As a matter of fact, a debate is now rising in Spain and in Catalonia, as recent articles reproduced at the end of the report show. Bernard Barraqué, May 2000

PART 1 : ANALYSIS OF WATER SUPPLIES AND NEEDS IN CATALONIA

• Demographic analysis by Francesc Magrinya • Water needs and supplies in the ATLL service area, by Josep C. Vergés • Potential availability of water in Western Catalonia, by Michel Drain • Water rights and possible transfers, by Esperanza Alcaín Martinez • Articles on water markets in Spain

WATER NEEDS IN CATALONIA : ANALYSIS OF POPULATION GROWTH PROJECTIONS Francesc Magrinya, Town Planner, ETSECCP-UPC, Barcelona 1. Introduction This survey aims to analyse population changes in the geographic areas that are relevant to water management in Catalonia, as well as future trends and estimates made under existing plans. To do this, we need to take census data broken down by towns, by counties (comarques) and for all of Catalonia, and adapt this information to the areas managed by Catalan water management bodies. In addition, we will have to combine recent population figures and forecast trends with the scenarios considered for current water management plans. 2. Areas under study The present population and forecast trends will be given for the following areas: - Catalonia - Conques Internes de Catalonia area (CIC), management level for water resources - Area serviced by Aigùes Ter Llobregat area (ATLL) - Barcelona Metropolitan Region area (RMB) Census data for Catalonia are broken down by towns, and then town figures are grouped into 38 counties and 6 territorial areas according to the relevant definition in the General Territorial Plan for Catalonia (PTGC). As shown in Fig. 3, these areas are the following: - Barcelona Metropolitan area - Comarques Gironines (Girona counties) - Camp de Tarragona - Comarques Centrals (Central counties) - Terres de l’Ebre - Ponent (Western) For the purposes of this study, the term Barcelona Metropolitan Region (RMB) exactly matches the Barcelona Metropolitan area. The Conques Internes de Catalonia area (see Figs. 1 and 2) is covered by the 1988 Water Management Plan and comprises the following catchment areas: • Northern Basin: Costa Brava Nord, Muga, Alt Fluvià, Baix Fluvià, Alt Ter I, Alt Ter II, Baix Ter I, Baix Ter II, Costa Brava Centre, Costa Brava Sud-Alt Maresme, Tordera. • Central Basin: Baix Maresme, Besos, Alt Llobregat I, Alt Llobregat II, Anoia, Baix Llobregat I, Baix Llobregat II, Garraf, Foix. • Southern Basin: Gaià, FrancolÌ, Baix Camp. • Baix Ebre-Montsià Basin: Baix Ebre, Montsià. The 1986 census is the source of the baseline population figures. Later census figures (1991 and 1996) have been taken from county-level data. The Conques Internes de Catalonia include the following counties: • Northern, Southern, and Western Basin - Barcelona Metropolitan area counties

- Girona counties - Camp de Tarragona counties except for Priorat - Central Counties except for Cerdanya • Baix Ebre-Montsià Basin - For the Baix Ebre Basin we consider changes in its three municipalities. - For the Montsià Basin, the 1986 figure has been considered a reasonable constant level. For the Aigües Ter Llobregat (ATLL) area of service, population figures were calculated by aggregating municipal-level figures.

Fig. 1 : situation of the Intern basins of Catalonia (CIC), and counties covered

Fig. 2 : Counties within or overlapping with the intern basins of Catalonia (CIC)

3. Population changes 1986-1996

Population change data are based on five-year censuses. The following tables show the figures for each of the relevant areas in the past ten years (1986-1991-1996), as well as calculated rates of change. Table 1 1986

1991

1996

Catalonia

5.978.638

6.059.494

6.090.040

Intern Basins of Catalonia (CIC)

5.476.847

5.557.297

5.584.662

Barcelona Metropolitan Area (RMB)

4.229.527

4.264.422

4.228.048

Zone Aigües Ter Llobregat (ATLL)

4.102.851

4.128.473

4.076.423

Table 2 Growth 1986-91

Growth 1991-96

Catalonia

1,35 %

0,50 %

Intern Basins of Catalonia (CIC)

1,47 %

0,49 %

Barcelona Metropolitan Area (RMB)

0,83 %

-0,85 %

Zone Aigües Ter Llobregat (ATLL)

0,62 %

-1,26 %

Now comparing population sizes shows the relative decrease of RMB: Table 3 in %

1986

1991

1996

RMB / Catalonia

70.74

70.38

69.43

ATLL / RMB

97.00

96.81

96.41

CIC / Catalonia

91.61

91.71

91.70

The first thing one can note is that the Catalonia area and the CIC area somewhat coincide, and that the Barcelona Metropolitan Region and the ATLL area also seem to match. Population change rates are parallel in both cases. Population increased in both five-year periods for Catalonia and for the CIC area. Conversely, RMB and ATLL growth slacked off; there was positive population growth in the first five years and negative growth in the second period (see Table 2). Looking at the ratio of RMB to Catalonia, we find that it has decreased in later years (70,74%-70,38%-69,43%) (see Table 3). This comes from a deliberate policy to balance development in Catalonia by promoting growth in province capitals, including the

surrounding urban areas. It is also the result of typical conurbation expansion processes, now reaching beyond the RMB area and restructuring it internally within a general dispersion process. Now in the two areas of present concern, CIC and ATLL, there is an almost constant correlation in the figures for CIC and Catalonia as a whole. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that there will be a close correlation in the future between the population of Catalonia and that of the CIC area, and to assume a 91.7% share of the Catalan population for this area, on average (see Table 3). On the other hand, the ATLL share in RMB is somewhat lower. This is because of suburbanization of the Barcelona conurbation, with significant growth in towns in the Vallès Oriental and Maresme counties that belong to the RMB area and not to the ATLL area. However, it may still be appropriate to estimate that this ATLL/RMB ratio will also remain constant at 96.5% (see Table 3). 4. Population change in the area under study The Institut d’Estadística de Catalonia (Catalan Institute of Statistics) notes the following in its analysis of population changes based on the latest census (1996): “ Between 1991 and 1996 there was a consolidation of the pattern that originated in the mid seventies, with low population growth and, in territorial terms, gradual fixing of the population in its existing settlements as well as the emergence and consolidation of new population-attracting poles within Catalonia. This pattern contrasts with traditional population concentration in the Barcelona area, so regional development now tends to even out this distribution, with population growth spread out through several geographic areas. ” (4) Concerning regional changes in the Barcelona conurbation area, “ The Metropolitan area counties, not including the Barcelonès, are gaining in relative weight (28.4% in 1975, 34.4% in 1996), though this cannot make up for the drop in the Barcelonès county itself. Thus, metropolitan Barcelona counties as a whole have a smaller share of the Catalan population, down from 71.0%to 69.4%. ” (4) On the other hand, further detailed analysis, as described by Cabré, shows that “ in terms of population differentiation, in the last five-year period (1991-1996) the RMB area has a central core of large and very large municipalities with a strong emigration trend but a considerable remaining potential for endogenous natural growth; an intermediate zone, with municipalities that have positive but moderate population inflows and natural growth; and an outer zone, comprising generally small rural municipalities where negative or slight natural population growth based on a history of emigration and ageing populations is counterbalanced by population inflows bringing in new, often young inhabitants, reversing the hitherto regressive trend. ” (6) 5. Forecasts in the General Territorial Plan for Catalonia (PTGC) Projections for regional planning were made in the General Territorial Plan for Catalonia passed in 1995. Traditionally, regional planning in Catalonia sought to balance population distribution, to compensate for the old settlement pattern that gravitated around the Barcelona

conurbation and centred on the coastline. Thus, the strategy proposed in the General Territorial Plan for Catalonia (PTGC) is “ to slow down the constant concentration process in metropolitan Barcelona counties and the receding share of other areas in the total Catalan population. The aim is to check the current concentration process, as this area has its own momentum leading to increased population in absolute terms; the ultimate goal is to prevent its growth in relative terms ”. The PTGC considered a specific scenario as its goal for population distribution by 2026: “ Based on population extrapolations carried out at the diagnostic stage, our working hypothesis involves a 1.5 million increase by 2026, that is, a total population of 7.5 million ”. In fact, the PTGC considers growth trends in Catalonia that predict a total population of 7.5 million, and within this envelope it aims to lessen the relative weight of the Barcelona Metropolitan area. Table 4 shows the resulting proposal: note that the increased share of other areas is offset by the smaller share of the Barcelona Metropolitan area (69.15% to 62.67%). Table 4 Trend 2026 Population % of total RMB Counties around Girona Tarragona plain Central counties Ponent area (west) Terres de l’Ebre

5.186.089 712.753 598.940 472.462 363.294 166.462

69,15 9,50 7,99 6,30 4,84 2,22

Proposal 2026 Population % of total 4.700.000 794.000 656.000 577.000 529.000 244.000

62,67 10,59 8,75 7,69 7,05 3,25

6. Guidelines considered by the PTMB The PTGC is to be implemented through specific territorial plans for each of the 6 above listed areas. Although the Barcelona Metropolitan Territorial Plan (PTMB) has not yet been approved, its drafting guidelines are known (8). The assumption is that actions under the PTMB must fit in with the PTGC’s estimates. Thus, the PTMB holds that “ the overall population in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area will spontaneously maintain its present slightly upward trend, which the PTGC aims to check by setting a desirable population ceiling of 4.7 million by 2026. ” However, PTMB estimates, made later, fall below the original PTGC estimate for the Barcelona Metropolitan Area; thus, the PTMB is only aiming for population growth up to 4.7 million, as set out in the PTGC. However, the PTMB commissioned two population surveys from the Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics ((2) and (3)). The first, drawn up in 1991, established forecasts for the 19862005 period on the basis of the 1986 population census and other restrictive municipal data. The second commissioned survey was to estimate growth for 1991-2011; this is the source of our present estimates for the RMB area and the ATLL area. According to this survey, “ population trends include a foreseeable increase in natural growth derived from a slight recovery in birth rates after the mid 1990s. This rise is both the effect of the age distribution the number and relative share of 20- to 40-year-old women will peak out between 1995 and 2005 - and of births delayed by present late marriage trends and resulting protraction of

generation intervals. The age distribution, conversely, will show gradual ageing, likely to speed up after 2010 as a result of lower mortality of aged persons and of lowered fertility rates, decreasing the relative share of younger people. “ As for migration-related growth, no significant inflow from the rest of Spain is to be expected, as the Catalan labour market will long remain under the combined effects of the need to streamline production and the pressure of the economically active population of Catalonia itself. However, regarding outflows, the sizeable share of Catalan residents born outside Catalonia is a potential pool of returnees. Foreign migration in the RMB area is closely intertwined with changes in the Catalan economy; future economic development will expectedly involve foreign migration. Although the balance of migration is not expected to be large in absolute terms, some economic sectors will certainly need considerable numbers of foreign workers. Thus, although foreign workers as a group will account for a small share of the metropolitan population, they are likely to concentrate in a few towns in the RMB. ”(3) Inspection of the 1986-2005 figures compared to those for 1991-2011 reveals a changing trend in population change in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area: “ Many shortcomings in projection figures are caused by population changes in the Larger First Region, where peripheral metropolitan growth, suburbanization, and overflow from middle-sized towns to their immediate surroundings stand out. ”(3) Conclusion from this survey : RMB population in 2011 will be 4,261,340. As this projection is dis-aggregated at municipal-level, one derives a figure of 4,096,470 inhabitants for the ATLL area. 7. Population growth prospects in the areas under study Another available survey was produced by the Institut d’Estadística de Catalonia. This narrows down population estimates for Catalonia as a whole. It is based on 1996 census figures and was drawn up for a technical conference that took place in 1997, so its projections are very recent. A total of 10 scenarios was considered in this case, in order to further pinpoint possible growth trends. According to the conclusions, “ The population span felt to be most operative, in a trade-off between breadth and likelihood, is that between scenarios E2 and E9. These two most-likely scenarios rule out extreme fertility rates (either a low or a high replacement rate) and consider only medium to high fertility rates, ranging from 1.5 to 1.8 births per woman. According to these operative scenarios, the population of Catalonia in 2010 should lie between 6.24 and 6.72 million. ” Another conclusion is that “ The most significant trait of population change between 2010 and 2030 is the slowdown in growth and acceleration of ageing, trends that consistently emerge in each of the scenarios considered. ” Thus, “ by combining natural growth (dropping sharply) and migration growth (growing moderately), the overall growth rate will decrease, under the scenarios considered, between 2010 and 2030, bottoming out between 2015 and 2025. Growth will almost always be positive in scenarios that include high migration rates or high fertility rates with a medium migration rate. For all other scenarios, negative absolute population growth is forecast as of 2014. ” These ranges, based on extreme scenarios E2 and E9 for the whole of Catalonia, will now be taken to recalculate ranges for the RMB and ATLL areas. In the case of the CIC area, we assume that the range of variation can be calculated by multiplying the figures for Catalonia as a whole by a constant factor of 0.917.

The RMB and ATLL forecast ranges are based on the percentage of the Barcelona Metropolitan area relative to the total for Catalonia. We deem this percentage to be equivalent for both, and the PTGC projections placed it between 69.15% and 62.67%; that is the assumption underlying our calculated ranges. For calculation purposes, we will look at the scenario results for the reference years of the various surveys considered here.

Table 5 Forecast Catalonia 2002 2005 2010 2011 2012 2025 2026 2030

E2 6,17 6,22 6,24 6,24 6,23 5,90 5,87 5,76

E9 6,33 6,49 6,72 6,76 6,79 7,03 7,05 7,17

Forecast RMB (RMB=69,15%Catalonia)

E2 4,27 4,30 4,31 4,31 4,31 4,08 4,06 3,98

E9 4,38 4,49 4,65 4,67 4,70 4,86 4,88 4,96

Forecast RMB (RMB=62,67%Catalonia)

E2 3,87 3,90 3,91 3,91 3,90 3,70 3,68 3,61

E9 3,97 4,07 4,21 4,24 4,26 4,41 4,42 4,49

Table 6

Forecast ATLL (=96,5% RMB) (RMB=69,15% Catalonia)

2002 2005 2010 2011 2012 2025 2026 2030

(RMB=62,67% Catalonia)

E2

E9

E2

E9

4,12 4,15 4,16 4,16 4,16 3,94 3,92 3,84

4,22 4,33 4,48 4,51 4,53 4,69 4,70 4,78

3,73 3,76 3,77 3,77 3,77 3,57 3,55 3,48

3,83 3,92 4,06 4,09 4,11 4,25 4,26 4,34

A comparison of the ATLL figures given here for 2011 and the projections in the 1991-2011 study (3) shows that the latter gave a forecast of 4,261,340 for the RMB area; as this study was based on municipal dis-aggregated figures, we may infer a forecast of 4,096,470 for the ATLL area. Table 6 forecasts for the ATLL area give a range of 4.16 million to 4.51 million assuming its share of the population is 69.15%, and a range of 3.77 to 4.09 million for a 62.67% share. Present data seem to come closer to scenario E2 than scenario E9. Furthermore, it is unlikely for the RMB share of the total Catalan population to drop as far as 62.67%. We are closer to the first column (4.16 million). A tentative range of 3.85 to 4.45 million may be put forward. Another remark on the projections in the Catalonia study is the fact that, in every scenario, population figures begin to drop as of 2012, so we may take the 2011-12 figures as ceiling values. They fall far short of the 4.925 million projected within the LRC aqueduct project (7). The most extreme scenario (E9 with 69.15%) gives a maximum figure of 4.7 million. Bibliography (1) CABRÉ Anna (1991), Algunes reflexions sobre el futur de la poblacio de Barcelona, One of the Pensem la ciutat series of lectures, Winter 1990, Bellaterra, Centre díEstudis Demogràfics, 1991 (2) CED (Centre d’Estudis Demografics) (1991), An‡lisi de la poblacio i el poblament del Pla Territorial Metropolita de Barcelona. 1986-2005, Bellaterra, Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics, 1991, Memo. (3) CED (Centre d’Estudis Demografics) (1993), Previsions demogràfiques de la Regio primera ampliada: 19912011, Bellaterra, 1993, Memo. (4) IEC (Institut d’Estadística de Catalonia) (1996), Estadística de Poblacio 1996. Vol.1 Xifres oficials. Dades comarcals i municipals, Generalitat de Catalonia, 1996. (5) IEC (Institut d’Estadística de Catalonia) (1997), Projeccions demogràfiques de Catalonia, Barcelona, Palau de la Generalitat, 26-27 May 1997. (6) CABRÉ, Anna and MODENES, Juan Antonio, “ Dinamiques demogràfiques recents a la Regio Metropolitana de Barcelona ”, Revista Economica de Catalonia, n° 33, December 1997, pp.66-76.

(7) Aqueducte Llenguadoc-Rossello/ Catalonia (1998). Estudi de viabilitat Tecnica. Informe d’evolucio, Summary document, January 1998. (8) PTMB (Pla Territorial Metropolità de Barcelona) (1998), Factors clau de la planificacio territorial a l’àrea metropolitana de Barcelona. Objectius, estudis i instruments del Pla Territorial Metropolità de Barcelona, Barcelona, Generalitat de Catalonia, 1998 (Pending publication).

Simplified map

The springs of the Segre are in France, in a complex area where Ariege (tributary to the Garonne) Aude and Têt (é French Mediterranean rivers) also have their springs. Segre receives several French tributaries before or after crossing the border, and then goes south in Western Catalonia, receives the water of the two Nogueras, and merges into the Ebro. Both at the level of the Cadi Tunnel, and of the embalse (reservoir) of Oliana, the river is less than 30

km away from the Llobregat basin, which is even shorter than the distance TarragonaBarcelona. The heavy irrigation area is around Lerida.

DEMAND FOR WATER IN THE ATLL SERVICED AREA OF CATALONIA Josep C. Vergés Societat Catalana d’Economia

Abstract This preliminary report has been written for Bernard Barraqué as part of the study of water demands of Catalonia. It looks at current demand for water in the central basins of Catalonia 11 which encompass the ATLL serviced area and which is in a long term downturn. Irrigation expansion is underway in other parts of Catalonia : this cannot be ignored because it is using up an alternative water supply in the Ebro basin for transfers in the ATLL serviced area, once the Ter transfer from the Northern basin is in full use. The Catalan water basins are far from being a single market. On the contrary current water policies aggravate the cost and supply problems of water. The unofficial REED plan of ATLL is analysed in its several components of Rhone, Ebro, Economies and Desalinisation. The Rhone project is a high cost project which could not be undertaken without the promised susbsidy from the European Investment Bank. There is no demand justification in the ATLL serviced area for this transfer. The Ebro alternative which is considereded by ATLL is another major investment which the author also finds mislaid because there are two low cost Ebro mini-transfers which make much more economic sense connecting an already functioning mini-transfer to Tarragona (mini in engineering terms, but with a current 40% excess capacity) and the Segre with the Cardener. These two minitransfers would be maxi-economic projects interconnecting for the first time the Catalan basins into a single market, improving water quality in a two way water transfer system which would also aid delta farmers in the Ebro during droughts. Economies are the third leg of the ATLL REED plan. The author here refers to his extensive water price studies showing that water behaves like an economic good with prices inducing the correct response from consumers in water use and water saving. Desalinisation does not seem a viable alternative from a cost point of view. But there are other non-conventional water resources : reusing the outflow from water treatment plants can provide as much water as the Rhone transfer for secondary uses. Catalonia has built a network of large treatment plants in the last two decades and the largest under construction is at the Llobregat delta near Barcelona. Water reuse is a viable low cost option given the initial investment that is already undertaken for pollution control as an alternative to new large infrastructure. Last but not least, groundwater resources are quite plentiful in Catalonia and are little exploited. Even the famous Llobregat delta aquifer has increasing spare resources as industrial and agriculture use declines. This report on water economics finds no demand or cost justifications for the Rhone transfer in the present situation or in the foreseeable future. 11

Central basins include chiefly the Llobregat, and cover the southern part of the Confederacion Hidrograficai (River basin authority) called Internal basins of Catalonia. They are bordered north by the Ter, which also flows directly to the sea, but where ATLL fetches part of its water. West of Catalonia is naturally drained by tributaries of the larger Ebro basin, and the southern part is the delta plain of this river.

Latent and Future Demand ATLL basically supplies Barcelona and surrounding urban areas 50 km around the capital of Catalonia. ATLL currently sells wholesale water to private and municipal water utilities that serve around 4 million inhabitants. According to the Pla Hidrològic, on which all current projections are based, consumption of the Central basins, with 4.5 million inhabitants and including the ATLL serviced area, had a planned demand of 865 Hm3/92, of which : Domestic Industrial Agricultural Minimum flow

541 Hm3 (62%) 204 Hm3 (24%) 100 Hm3 (12%) 20 Hm3 (2%)

The consortium ALRC, as a result of the projections of the Pla Hidrològic, estimates a 218 Hm3 increase in sales by ATLL in the next thirty years, which doubles its current capacity. Production of water by the main private company AGBAR is supposed to stagnate and other utilities are to reduce their use of wells by a half, as is shown in Table 1. The rest of the growth of ATLL is based on population estimates which are taken piecemeal, with rapid growth expected in the outer area and stagnation in Barcelona itself. Consumption per head is also supposed to rise from 308 l/d to 354 l/d. ‘Latent demand’ is the driving force for this change, and is defined as unsatisfied water demand because of local deficiencies in quality or capacity. ATLL as a result would increase its market share from 45% in 1994 to 70% in 2025. Unfortunately real water consumption is nowhere near the figures planned. In 1997 ATLL sales were 35 Hm3 lower than projected and consumption 221 l/d per person, i.e. 28% less. BRL does not seem aware that the bulk of the Rhone transfer will be used for substituting resources with the latent demand strategy. BRL in its presentation document states categorically: “Il ne s’agit pas de substituer ces volumes à des ressources locales actuellement utilisées. Cette eau apportée à Barcelone ne libèrera pas l’eau actuellement mobilisée pour l’usage urbain.” Table 1: Planning Water Deficits in the Central Basins Hm3 ATLL Sales AGBAR Utility Wells Total Consumption l/d per person

1994 226 100 173

2025 444 100 92

Difference 218 -81

% 97% 0% -47%

499 308

636 354

137 46

28% 15%

Source : Elaborated from ALRC, Informació General

Latent demand is defined by ATLL as unsatisfied demand because of a deficient water supply. Additional demand to the regional network has two components: An increase in demand to satisfy needs and a substitution of local supplies to increase reliability and quality. Latent demand seems a contorted way of justifying future growth of supplies in the face of current falling demand for water. ATLL admits that there is falling demand “probably only

short term”, as a result of the economic crisis (in the distant seventies), of increase in the price of water, of greater availability of well water because of greater rainfall and water saving by industry. Latent demand thus is the way to guarantee water against drought and to improve quality. This is supply sided growth in consumption, not far removed from the discredited ‘needs model’ of water planners where water was supplied regardless of demand. The president of ATLL Francesc Vilaró argues that there is a low water security of 400 Hm3 /y because of the quality problems. Quality he defines as public acceptance of drinking water. Transfers are the way of guaranteeing this quality. ATLL bases its latent demand on the dry year 1994 and takes up unquestioning the population predictions of the former Pla Territorial Metropolità de Barcelona and the Pla Territorial General de Catalonia. These predict a rise in population for the area from 4,435,391 in 1994 to 4,926,149 in 2025. However ATLL recognises that “globally demand for water is fully met, and if anything a stagnation and even a downfall has been observed in recent years. Industrial consumption has fallen more than domestic.” As a result, instead of finding the demand for domestic and industrial consumption at various prices and elasticities, ATLL proceeds to analyse “real water shortages and the problem of reliability and quality of local wells.” Indeed, in a move to avoid the difficulty of defining future industrial water consumption, “future demand is based on global county supplies of domestic, public and industrial water.” ATLL has gone full circle back to the needs model with demand defined in terms of supply. No mention is made of prices and elasticities in latent demand. The real variable is population, the same as in the needs model, with an additional quality factor and enforced substitution of local wells as in the even more discredited command economy of the Autocracy period. Current demand for water is defined by the volume supplied. In 1994, 499 Hm3 were consumed in the ATLL area, outside agriculture which is not even considered: ATLL AGBAR Utlity wells Industrial wells

220 Hm3 (44%) 110 Hm3 (22%) 97 Hm3 (19%) 73 Hm3 (14%)

Two thirds, or 313 Hm3, was domestic and one third, or 156 Hm3, industrial consumption. These figures for 1994 already show a marked reduction compared to the Pla Hidrològic where consumption in the ATLL serviced area was supposed to be in 1992 521 Hm3 domestic and 196 Hm3 industrial, i.e. a total of 717 Hm3. No minor error, a shortfall of 217 Hm3 or 43% less water demand than expected. Given this huge error in short term planning, predictions for the long term based solely on population growth are useless. Population is not growing. Industrial consumption is also falling and no amount of globalization can hide away that one third of current demand is diminishing, whatever the population growth. Finally it is not true that substitution will take place from local wells to high cost transfers. If spare water in aquifers and reusable water from treatment plants are added to the already significant current 35% consumption from wells, the opposite is true. ATLL is experiencing a falling demand because of the continued growth in consumption from wells and other sources. ATLL admits this in its latest Annual Report: “Water utilities show a marked priority for local sources, causing big variations between wet and dry seasons for ATLL water.”

Table 2 shows that consumption has fallen 10% from 341 Hm3 in 1991 to 307 Hm3 in 1997 in the area, with ATLL suffering an even worse demand downturn of 20% from 238 Hm3 /91 to 191 Hm3 /97. Taking three year averages to eliminate yearly oscillations, the fall is still 6% for the area and 10% for ATLL. ATLL experiences a greater fall in demand because it supplies water utilities which use wells and other primary sources. ATLL has lost 8% market share in these six years, a loss over one point a year. Taking three year averages the trend reflects more closely the availability of local supplies, with a three point increase in market share for ATLL to begin with and later a six point drop. This high degree of substitution in the short term should make ATLL wary of committing itself to a fixed long term supply that would double its capacity. Table 2: The Falling Demand for ATLL Water (Hm3) Three year averages 1991-1993 1992-1994 1993-1995 1994-1996 1995-1997 Actual Consumption: 1991 1997 Difference 1991-97 % lost sales Difference 1991-93 to 1995-97 % lost sales

Total Demand 326 315 310 308 308

of which ATLL 223 219 219 212 201

% ATLL 68% 70% 71% 69% 65%

341 307

238 191

70% 62%

-34 -10%

-47 -20%

-18 -6%

-22 -10%

Source: Elaborated from ATLL, Memòria

In 1997 consumption per head was 221 l/d, of which ATLL served 138 l/d. Average consumption of ATLL water for the 14 year period 1984-1997 is 220 Hm3 /y. However in the last ten years only four have exceeded this average compared to six for the first ten years. At best long term consumption will not exceed this average. The latest figures from AGBAR, the main ATLL wholesale water buyer, show consumption falling between 1992 and 1997. This decline is even more eye opening in that the number of AGBAR customers in this same period increased at 1.2% p.a., or 30,000 new consumers a year. As a result average consumption has fallen from 133.5 m3/y per family to 122.5 m3/y. Long term consumption for an average family unit of around 2.5 is not going to be more than 120 m3/y. This means the long term domestic consumption is between 120 and 165 l/d per person, with an average 145 l/d as reasonable expected domestic consumption for the ATLL serviced area. Francesc Arroyo shows a graph (see Table 3) with an even greater drop in demand of 15% for AGBAR water. Table 3: Long Term Consumption in Barcelona

Source: F. Arroyo, El consumo de agua en el 2025 será la mitad de lo previsto por la Generalitat

Industrial consumption has fallen more, a 20% drop between 1992 and 1998 in the AGBAR network, as against a drop of 3% in domestic consumption. Given the downtrend in domestic and especially industrial consumption, Joan Barrera suggests that the main interest of the Rhone project comes from BRL to have its concession extended beyond 2031. AGBAR is the main customer of ATLL as well as producing water from the Llobregat river and aquifer. A daily consumption of 222 l/d in the ATLL area must mean that there is plenty of room for long term industrial and even domestic water reductions in consumption following the Barcelona trend. The Pla Hidrològic plans 726 l/d domestic consumption which would require households to increase fivefold the number of its members at current AGBAR consumption rates. In 1995, before being appointed to the scientific committee set up by ATLL to review the Rhone transfer, ecology professor Narcis Prat criticised the expected population and consumption growth in the plans: “Planners are stuck in Franco’s development plans of the sixties and have yet to learn that economic growth does not require a parallel growth of water consumption.” Irrigation in Catalonia Increases by 50% ? Irrigation is the main water user in Catalonia by far, mostly concentrated in the Ebro basins. 835 Hm3/y new irrigation is planned, 85% of which in the Ebro Catalan sub-basins, but a significant new 123 Hm3/y in the inner basins where ATLL operates (Table 4). This water is practically free for farmers, so the Generalitat de Catalonia now proposes limiting future demands by extending the Canon d’Infraestructures Hidráuliques (water charge) from the inner basins or Conques Internes to the Catalan basins of the Ebro, a tax of 13.20 ptas/m3 for piped water and 0.90 ptas/m3 for irrigation. The farmers irrigating from the Urgell, Pinyana and Aragó i Catalonia canals have protested so much that the proposal was on hold until at least after the elections in 1999. At the same time the Generalitat wants to increase irrigated areas in Catalonia by 50%, explains Lluís Visa. Current investment underway is 29,000 million ptas for new 25,400 ha. of irrigation, but the plan is to invest 211,775 million ptas for another 136,819 ha. of irrigation. The largest project is the 100 km long Segarra-Garrigues canal, costing more than the 10 m3/s Rhone transfer, 160,000 million ptas for 327 Hm3/y of water, according to Magda Gutierrez. According to El País, Catalan autonomists have subjected their support to the water markets law prepared by the Partido Popular to a 50% subsidy on this project.

Table 4: New Irrigation in Catalonia Inner Basins Surface (103 ha): Current Planned Water vol. (Hm3/y): Current Planned

Ebro basins Total Catalonia

% Ebro basins

12

213 114

277 126

77% 91%

371 123

2151 712

2522 835

85% 85%

Source. Elaborated from the Plans Hidrològics de les Conques Internes i de l’Ebre

The Ebro currently plans an efficiency of 60% in irrigation. In fact current efficiency is only 51%, which means half the water is wasted before irrigation. Narcis Prat considers efficiency could be 83% of water use : in that case, 4,500 m3/ha would be enough compared to 6,500 m3/ha unmetered water for the efficient canal de Urgell farmers. Albert Juanola of the Conselleria d’Agricultura explains that 70% of irrigation in Catalonia is still done by traditional gravity methods, 12% by aspersion and 20% by localised watering. The Urgell farmer pays 10% of the cost of the Tagus-Segura transfer, the benchmark price for an economic approach to water transfers according to my recent book. Pinyana canal farmers pay even less (5,735 Ptas/ha Urgell, 3,857 Ptas/ha Pinyana and 54,000 Ptas/ha Tagus-Segura). The irrigation in the new Rialb reservoir will be limited to 4,500 m3/ha in the Segrià and 1,500 m3/ha in South Garrigues and Terra Alta. This latter assignation is defined as deficit irrigation, providing water for the initial growth phase of the plant but not for the consumption phase. These continued increases of free water while piped water has to pay high cost supplies is one of the biggest scandals in European water management. Catalonia reflects Spanish policy of increasing irrigation, which already consumes 80% of water, while paying, according to the Plan Hidrológico Nacional, 1 pta/m3 compared to more than 100 pta/m3 on average for domestic and industrial consumers. In the last twenty years the irrigation area has increased 28% in Spain while dryland farming has decreased 11%. The current trend is for dryland farming to disappear in Catalonia. The ATLL serviced area has only 12% agricultural water consumption, as can be seen in table 5. Assurances that the Rhone transfer will not be used directly for agriculture are legally correct, as President Clinton would say. However, given the increasing irrigation in the Ebro basins, the possibilility of using Ebro water for higher valued uses disappears, forcing urban and industrial consumers to look for ever costlier supplies. One of the issues is that water resources in Catalonia are not distributed where population and industry flourishes. Of the total regulated resources in table 5, 86% are in the Catalan basins of the Ebro and only 14% in the inner basins, the Conques Internes, where 90% of the population lives. Consumption varies greatly in the different basins. In the ATLL central basins 12% is for agricultural consumption, while in the Ebro basins the corresponding figure goes up to 92%. Tarragona with 1% of resources has an agricultural consumption of 45%. For Catalonia as a whole agricultural consumption is 73%, certainly lower than the Spanish average of 80%, but still extraordinarily high given the problems facing domestic and industrial consumers, with resp. only 6% and 11% of resources. These sharp variations in available resources and consumption, coupled to highly discriminatory water tariffs, makes the interconnection of the Catalan basins, as proposed in the Ebro section, together with a

more fair pricing policy in the Economies chapter, the first priorities for Catalan water in a rational European sense. Table 5: Water Resources and Consumption in Catalonia Basins

Resources

Piped water

Industrial wells

Irrigation

86%

3%

5%

92%

14%

52%

24%

24%

8%

32%

22%

46%

5%

63%

25%

12%

1% 100% 9,496

32% 6% 628

23% 11% 412

45% 73% 2,870

Catala basins of the Ebro Inner basins (Conques Internes) of which: Northern basins (Muga, Fluvià, Ter, Tordera) Central basins (Llobregat, Besós, Foix) Southern basins (Francolí, Gaià, Tarragona coast) Catalonia Hm3 /1989

Note: The first column (resources) adds vertically. The other three columns add horizontally to 100%. Source: J. C. Vergés, El finançament del cicle integral de l’aigua and Qüestions plantejades per a la gestió dels recursos hídrics: El preu de l’aigua

By solely considering the central basins of Catalonia, where domestic and industrial demand is concentrated but with only 5% of Catalan resources, planners easily arrive at deficits and exaggerations such as declared by Francesc Vilaró, president of ATLL: “We want consumption levels similar to the South of France, but our resources are less than Jordan, the Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia”. Catalonia potentially has 9,500 Hm3 /y available, or 1,583 m3 per person, 35 times current consumption in Barcelona. The central basins in the ATLL serviced area still consume in agriculture 86 Hm3, half of industry’s 174 Hm3, also from wells, and 442 Hm3 piped water in 1989. Surface flows relative to current consumption for the two main rivers supplying the central basins should not be underestimated: • Llobregat (68 year average at Martorell): 21 m3/s or 653 Hm3/y • Ter (50 year average at Roda de Ter): 17 m3/s or 542 Hm3/y It should not be forgotten that the Ter transfer, which can be substituted by Rhone transfers, currently has a 46% agricultural water use, easily expandable. The lack of water pricing in, and the continued policy of free infrastructure for agriculture paid by other consumers, is the source of Catalan water problems. The latest central government Libro Blanco, still unpublished, gives a surplus for Catalonia according to Inmaculada Mardones of 270 Hm3/y out of planned 1.302 Hm3/y domestic and industrial consumption, with local deficits of 100 Hm3 because of the lack of interconnections between Catalan basins. In my recent book on water policy I proposed to extend the Tagus-Segura transfer tariff to all canals. If this realistic price were paid by farmers in Catalonia, as irrigation demand would fall, the release of water would cover all foreseeable other consumer demands given the high rate of agricultural consumption. An 8% drop in irrigation doubles water available for domestic consumption in all Catalonia. As an example of current waste, 29% of irrigated crops are dryland cereals and irrigation losses are greater than total industrial water consumption.

The REED Planning by ATLL: the Rhone Transfer ATLL is informally planning on four independent lines: the Rhone transfer, the Ebro transfer, Economies, and Desalination, which they describe as the REED plans. The next three sections deal with these separate approaches. The Rhone transfer presents two options, the first for 15 m3/s and a newer supposedly more cost conscious alternative for 10 m3/s, with one third less capacity. However costs vary very little, only 18% less in fixed yearly costs as can be seen in table 6. As a result water prices are not very different between the two alternatives, once variable costs are added which are greater for the reduced pipeline. At full capacity the difference in water prices would be still a significant 50%, but at more realistic operating volumes the difference is only 29%. In fact at 40% capacity of the 15 m3/s option and 60% capacity of the 10 m3/s alternative, the water price is almost identical for the same amount transferred (113.75 ptas/m3 and 108.07 ptas/m3 for 189 Hm3 of Rhone water). From an operating cost point of view there is little to choose from. However operating prices will greatly affect general ATLL operations and the final water price for consumers. Against a current wholesale price of around 25 ptas/m3 for ATLL water, the Rhone transfer costs up to six times more. Considering the problems of water substitution and falling demand which ATLL encounters today, once the Rhone transfer is undertaken, the corresponding forced future price increases will accelerate rather than diminish the downward trend in demand. The real price of wholesale water once the Rhone operation is underway at current projections and assuming no cost increases in the construction stage, is shown in table 7 which averages the Rhone transfer prices with current prices and volumes served by ATLL. Final wholesale prices of ATLL water will have to double at least after the Rhone transfer. This doubling of wholesale prices has been criticised by the ex-communist IC, giving a figure of 61 ptas/m3, very similar to ours. IC criticises that planners inflate figures for population growth and expected consumption without testing the data, because their objective is to “build infrastructure and in particular establish a sort of spiritual connection with Europe.” Instead IC proposes, in the face of falling demand, planners should concentrate on the three R’s: Reduced consumption, Reuse of treated water and Recycling. Table 6. Financial Cost of the Rhone Transfer ARLC transfer Thousand Million Ptas.: - Fixed Investment - Fixed costs per year of which: - 6.5% interest for 50 years -Operating costs Ptas/ m3: - Variable costs

15 m3/s 473H m3/y

10 m3/s 315H m3/y

% difference -33%

196 17

149 14

-24% -18%

13 4

10 4

-23% 0%

23.90

34.00

42%

- Variable and fixed costs at: 100% capacity 60 % capacity 40% capacity

50.84 83.80 113.75

78.44 108.07 145.11

54% 29% 28%

Source: Elaborated from ATLL, Estudi de viabilitat tècnica

Table 7: ATLL Wholesale Prices After the Rhone Transfer in Hm3/year: Average sales 1995-1997 - 100% capacity of transfer - 60% - 40% Ptas/ m3: - 100% capacity of transfer - 60% - 40%

15 m3/s

10 m3/s

308 473 284 189

308 315 189 126

40.65 53.21 58.75

52.02 56.59 59.87

Note. A 25 Ptas/m3 current wholesale price is estimated plus the capacity prices of the previous table. Source: Elaborated from Table 6

The Ebro Transfers In 1998 ATLL has added service to the area South of Barcelona, reaching Vilafranca del Penedès and Vilanova i la Geltrú, both just 50 km from Tarragona, which is the Northern end of the mini-transfer from the Ebro delta currently in operation. This canal provides water for Tarragona, but is only at half capacity. For two years water was sold to Majorca by ship from Tarragona, but this land and sea transfer has been discontinued because the high cost induced the correction of leakage, the reuse of treated water : the higher tariffs to pay for the transfer incurred a falling demand in Majorca as expected. Ships are not a fixed infrastructure and the Majorca transfer could be discontinued after it was (quickly) discovered that there were better alternatives than this high cost transfer. Discontinuing the transfer would not be possible for the large project of the Rhone : it would remain in place even if proven totally uneconomic once finished. As a matter of fact, the current mini-transfer from the Ebro to Tarragona is a limited version of a grandiose transfer planned to Barcelona during the desarrollismo of the seventies. The project was scaled down to the current 3 m3/s pipeline, never used at more than half capacity a decade after the initial investment in 1989. ATLL would find relatively inexpensive connecting the Ter transfer and the Abrera wells of the Llobregat with the Ebro transfer at Tarragona. There is even an important reservoir, the Foix, for storing water for peak demands and droughts. One advantage of the Ter, Llobregat and Ebro basins connection with a mini-transfer is that the flows can go both ways. That is when there is excess water, which happens as often as droughts in this Mediterranean climate, water can be sent to the Ebro delta farmers. BRL points out that the Ebro has severe Summer droughts, but winter flows are five times as large, permitting stocking in reservoirs of 300 to 400 H m3/y. The Foix reservoir is never full and can be an excellent additional supply of water once the Tarragona connection is completed. According to Francis Imbert, BRL director of

the project ALRC, the exploitation rate of the Ebro is 50%, compared to 67% for the Po, 91% for the Nile (and, of course, only 4% for the Rhone). Besides, Ebro delta farmers are already used to being paid for not using water : they received compensations in the California style water market set up during the Majorca transfers ; so there wouldn’t be any political problem today in establishing this connection. In the opinion of water specialist Daniel Pagès, the grand Ebro-Llobregat-Ter union through the minitransfer is the most justifiable investment in Catalonia which fully deserves European funds for completion much more clearly than the major Rhone infrastructure now being subsidised. Another Ebro-Inner Basins conection was proposed 40 years ago by Victoriano Muñoz, as described by the same specialist : he wanted to connect the Pyrenean rivers to the coast through a Segre transfer to the Cardener. The Segre supplies half the surplus Ebro water and is good quality water which does not suffer the salt problems of the Ebro. Connecting the two Pallaresa rivers to the Segre would release 400 Hm3/y. The Segre-Cardener transfer is relatively simple, a distance of 25 kms crossing a mountain range of 900 metres, compared to the 320 km for the Rhone transfer, rising 200 meters at the coastal Pyrenees. The new Rialb reservoir under construction can be used to store water and make up for a transfer to the Sant Ponç reservoir on the Cardener. The Segre-Cardener transfer would also solve the quality problems due to rock salt mines in the Llobregat which so worry ATLL, in marked contrast to AGBAR who actually sell most of the Llobregat water to consumers. This second infrastructure would reinforce the connection of the major basins in Catalonia and is also of a higher priority, in the opinion of this author, than the Rhone transfer, at a fraction of the cost. Lastly, the danger of failed big investments should not be ignored. ATLL has already cut in half consumption projections of transfers in the Pla Hidrològic from 416 Hm3/y to 218 Hm3/y. The reason may be in an unknown case of useless infrastructure : the 6 m3/s and 22 km pipe from the ATLL Abrera wells to the AGBAR Sant Joan Despí plant which has cost 17,000 million ptas and has only been used at 8% capacity since inauguration in 1994, as Joaquim Elcacho reports. Interest payments are 1,300 million ptas a year for this tube with 92% excess capacity planned in the big infrastructure heyday of the seventies. ATLL bought the Abrera wells from AGBAR, bailing out a failed private investment and proceeded to build the tube. The initial projected cost of 4,000 million ptas more than quadrupled. The only use for this engineering folly is as a “guarantee against accidents” according to the Barcelona area water authority president Manel Hernàndez. This public engineering fantasy has added 11 ptas/ m3 to the Barcelona water tariff. Applying these real infrastructure costs to the Ebro and Segre transfers, with a 6 m3/s pipeline at 800 million ptas/km, the investment would be 39,000 million ptas to connect the Ebro canal at Tarragona with ATLL and 19,000 milllion ptas to bridge the Segre and Cardener basins. Compared to the 10 m3/s Rhone transfer, the Ebro proposal is a quarter the cost and the Segre alternative is even cheaper : 13% of the ALRC investment. At the planned Rhone transfer costs, it would be even lower. ATLL has yet to study an Ebro transfer, but their plans are not on a manageable scale as here proposed. Rather a major transfer is again planned from the Ebro proper to Barcelona ; in fact it is the old seventies dream. Given the economic rationality of the mini-transfers from the Ebro basin, there is little sense in dwelling on the engineering qualities of another major work on the drawing board. Albert Serratosa, director of the Pla Territorial Metropolità de

Barcelona, supports this smaller scale and more realistic water planning, calling for “interconnections rather than transfers.” Water conservation and desalination The quality of river water in Catalonia is increasing as is shown in table 8 with the Llobregat, especially the upper reaches, such as the Cardener down to the Sant Ponç reservoir. The lower part of the Llobregat now still has a medium to low quality. However quality indexes are misleading in Mediterranean rivers, because some biological indicators do not exist at all. In the last twenty years river quality has doubled. Half the Llobregat length is now of maximum quality and only 4% low or poor quality. Table 8: The Improvement in the Biological Quality of the Llobregat % of river length BILL Quality 1979 0-1 8% 2-3 13% 4-5 33% 6-7 25% 8-10 21%

1997 0% 4% 32% 12% 52%

Note: BILL is a biological index based on macroinvertebrates Source: Prat, N., Munné, A., Solà, C., Bonada, N., Rieradevall, M. Perspectivas de la utilización de los insectos como bioindicadores del estado ecológico de las aguas. Aplicación a rios mediterráneos.

Water treatment and falling demand have caused this inflection. Not including industry, there are now 197 functioning sewage works in Catalonia, treating 569 Hm3/y. By the Millenium there will be 300, treating more than 850 Hm3/y. Narcis Prat and investigators at the Department of ecology of Barcelona University recommend reusing this water for greater dilution, since the main problem in Mediterranean rivers is extreme flows. The Llobregat delta aquifer has an increasing capacity available because of falling agricultural and industrial consumption. Total consumption has fallen from 129 Hm3 in 1973 to 54 Hm3 in 1994 as can be seen in table 9. Today the aquifer has at least 75 Hm3/y spare capacity, 60% of water use in the aquifer twenty years ago. The construction of a huge water treatment plant in 1999 in the delta for 3 m3/s and 800,000 population-equivalent will release a further 40 Hm3/y of reusable water. This plant will eventually double its capacity to 6 m3/s. Water available in the main consumption area of Barcelona will double in a decade compared to twenty years ago. According to Narcís Prat, 41% of treatment outflow is reusable, which means that currently Catalonia has 238 Hm3/y reusable water. In 1998 only 5% of water was reused in Catalonia, compared to 38% in Los Angeles and 21% in California. California recharges aquifers with 60 Hm3/y of reusable water and has a parallel network of pipes with total consumption of 8.3 m3/s. The Consorci Costa Brava, Vitoria and Estepona have pioneered water reuse. Reuse in Catalan agriculture saves 70% of the expenditure in nutrients. Reutilisation is the secondary source of water in Catalonia. Barcelona has currently 6 m3/s reusable water available. However there are no plans to reuse water from the biggest sewage plant under construction in the Llobregat delta. The importance of wells in Catalonia should not be underestimated as planners systematically do. The exploitation of the Llobregat delta aquifer by industry and Barcelona only started in 1893. Andreu Galofré explains that the aquifer is so rich that one industry extracted 15,000

m3/d and Barcelona and surrounding cities were supplied exclusively by the aquifer until the mid 1950s. Consumption from the aquifer of piped water reached 75 Hm3/y or 2 m3/s. The long term availability of this groundwater next to the main consumption centre should signal a comeback for the aquifer if high cost surface alternatives are finally shelved. According to Andreu Galofré, in 1990 the 30 main aquifers with an area of 9,937 km2 sheltered 1,414 Hm3 resources, of which only 464 Hm3 or 33% were extracted. The largest aquifers are: • Ports de Beseit on the Ebro basin: 325 Hm3 • Cadí-Taga-Ripoll on the Ter: 158 Hm3 • Llobregat Delta: 132 Hm3 The two largest aquifers in Catalonia are completely unused. Only one third of aquifers are actually exploited fully, one third partially and the rest remains unused, with a current excess capacity of two thirds of resources or 950 Hm3, equivalent to the total industrial and domestic demand for water in Catalonia.

Table 9: Falling Demand in the Llobregat Delta Aquifer

Groundwater is systematically underestimated, when not simply ignored, by planners. This reflects not only a preference for large surface infrastructure but also the fact that groundwater is difficult to control by planners : utility wells are the current and growing competitor of ATLL transfers. However, groundwater plays an important role in guaranteeing supplies in a Mediterranean climate of regular droughts in Summer and cyclically every decade. Miguel Mariño shows how wells behave like money in the bank in California, which has the same climate as Catalonia. Water accumulates in wet seasons to be withdrawn in dry seasons, even beyond the short term reusable rate, that is during droughts, when there is a deficit ; a fact overlooked by planners to have their infrastructure plans accepted. Wells are a very efficient

safety factor in assuring a stable consumption in the face of the very variable Mediterranean climate ; as R. Llamas repeatedly pointed, pumping water from wells is costly so that uses are more efficient. Consumption from wells in Catalonia can be up to 60% of total water use. Planners ignore this as shown with the Pla de Sanejament of the eighties. Groundwater was finally doubled by planners between 1982 and 1994, to 30% of industrial well use, when my own figures showed it represented 80% in the Llobregat ; and even the Junta de Sanejament surveys (which were not synthesised except by me) showed 56% groundwater use, double their final planned figure. The Junta de Sanejament estimated 37 Hm3/81 and 91 Hm3/94 groundwater use in industry for all Catalonia. That is 9% rising to 22% of the real industrial well consumption of 412 Hm3/89. Currently 11,000 wells are monitored out of a planned monitored total of 30,000. Groundwater has completely recovered for use according to Catalan public works minister Pere Macias. Piped water consumption is also not behaving as planners think. A 50 year look at AGBAR water sales shows a rise from 3 m3/s in 1950 to 10 m3/s in 1973. Growth then levels off to a maximum of less than 12 m3/s in 1989. Today consumption is down to what it was 25 years ago in 1973 and AGBAR does not expect any future upturn 12. The Llobregat aquifer remains the key element according to AGBAR in supplying Barcelona, with a capacity of 114 Hm3 of which 5 m3/s is extracted, half current consumption, and 0.8 m3/s artificially recharged. This aquifer is the equivalent of a major reservoir right where consumption is. The current capacities in the Llobregat delta are substantial: • 100 Hm3 from the aquifer, of which 30 Hm3 is recharged water later pumped up ; • 20 Hm3, from mini-reservoirs for shortfalls under construction by AGBAR ; • 250 Hm3 reusable water from treatment plants. This gives a total of 370 Hm3/y of resources additional to the surface Llobregat and ATLL sales to AGBAR. Josep Maria Miralles of AGBAR is absolutely optimistic about the sustainable management of the Llobregat water system. The delta aquifer is the equivalent of the major La Baells reservoir of the headwaters right under Barcelona. Since the Sant Just Desvern water treatment plant opened in 1954, aquifer water has been mixed with surface water. Current guaranted supplies are 120-150 Hm3/y, 20% to 50% more than what ATLL is planning for AGBAR in Table 1. In the future reusable water will also be mixed, increasing even further guaranteed supplies. Josep Maria Miralles is critical of planners because they do not take into account that water has a cost and is very expensive to transport. The director of AGBAR, Josep Lluis Jové, explains why planning does not work: “All hydrological plans are normally well prepared. Unfortunately the hypotheses and groundwork on which they are based are wrong.” Domestic consumption is falling and the Institut Català d’Energia estimates 30% less industrial water use than planned. Recycling has had a large impact in industry. Narcis Prat notes a saving of 40 Hm3/y, a quarter of all industrial water use in the last ten years, and comments: “planners inflate consumption to arrive at a latent deficit when there is not a single town suffering water problems.” Planners forget about reusable water as well, which is increasingly available from water treatment plans as mentioned earlier. ATLL has yet to undertake desalinisation studies, but at the Rhone transfer prices we have seen here it might be a viable option : prices are down to 1$/m3, and in Almeria, they go even 12

Àngel Barrufet of AGBAR gives the following average consumption per type of user for 1990-1994: 0.5% are industrial users, consuming 21% of piped water ; 10.5% commercial, consuming 6% ; 88.5% domestic, consuming 62% ; 0.5% municipal and other, consuming 11%. Losses are 20% to 30%, of which two thirds are due to under-metering, and the rest in transport. There doesn’t seem to be many leaks, and therefore little potential on this side.

further down starting with briny water. In any case, treating the salinity in the Llobregat is a much cheaper alternative to sea-water and should be part of the future ATLL study given that there are already treatment plants in Sant Joan Despí and Abrera. Catalan rivers in fact are currently suffering from an excess of infrastructure. Of four main rivers (the two Noguera, the Llobregat and the Ter), only 17% of their length is free flow. The rest is infrastructure regulated, 52% hydrolelectric, 22% large reservoirs and 9% irrigation. Narcís Prat and others in the Department of ecology of Barcelona University single out especially the damage caused by hydroelectricity. The Ter has 45 mini-stations affecting 82% of river length and the Llobregat 55. These hydroelectric stations with clean energy in fact short-circuit rivers, leaving large stretches dry during droughts. Public water supply is not the major cause of ecosystem damages. A Preliminary conclusion on the ALRC Proposal ATLL declares in the Annual Reports that its decisions must have an economic foundation: “The public service that ATLL provides has an undeniable economic content. As a result ATLL is financed by a tariff that covers the total economic cost of the service.” The Rhone transfer seen in economic terms does not fulfil these economic criteria, even with the profit motive eliminated. Further, ATLL president Francesc Vilaró admits that “demand for ATLL water is at a historical minimum, but local resources are not a sufficient guarantee and demand could jump back to the maximum of 1988-1990 when reservoirs were emptied.” Even ignoring the historical downward trend shown in this report, the variation for ATLL water in the fourteen year period of 1984-1997 is only 47 Hm3 from the historical minimum of 1997 to the historical maximum of 1987. Current ATLL capacity guarantees 230 Hm3, so we are talking at most of a 20 Hm3 shortfall once every ten years, not quite the requirement for a big scale 315 Hm3/y transfer from the Rhone. Small transfers from the Ebro as proposed here, a better use of groundwater and reusable water, and price led economies can cover amply this drought demand. In emergency situations the 75% agricultural water use is also available, once the mini-transfers are in place, obviously compensating farmers. Demand management is a better and much cheaper alternative to continuing with the discredited needs model, now disguised as the wishing well of latent demand. Significantly ALRC ends its report on the Rhone transfer with a cry for subsidies: “Data is provisional because studies are still underway and current figures do not take into account subsidies which would make a great difference to the costs the user must bear.” The Rhone transfer requires an international treaty but the Madrid government considers this a low priority project. Environment minister Isabel Tocino said it should not even be taken seriously: “A discussion of water scarcity and water supply is useful, but a transfer is light years away. With groundwater use, recycling and desalinisation this outdated concept of transfers will be abandoned. The important object is better management of water in Spain, the driest country in Europe but which consumes the greatest amount of water.” To answer the outcry by Juan de Dios Izquierdo of the European Parliament, who urges the European Commission to complement the interconnections of water basins at European level, everybody understands that one should better manage the demands before investing. The first transfers Europe should guarantee in Catalonia are the Ebro mini-connections, at a fraction of

the cost of the Rhone transfer and definitely aiding in regulating deficits and crisis situations and the good management of water. Water is not free, even in engineering terms. The ancient Indians already new this, as Kautilyn said in 400 B.C., reported by Sharma at a UNESCO conference on the ‘looming crisis of water’: “A king should construct dams, reservoirs, filled with water from perennial sources or by drawing from some other source. Those who cultivate land by irrigation through manual labour shall pay one fifth of the produce as the water rate, those carrying water on shoulders (of bullocks) shall pay one fourth of the produce, those by mechanical lifting shall pay one third of the produce, while those drawing water from lakes, tanks and wells shall pay one third to one fourth of produce.” This means the price of water 2400 years ago was between 20% and 33% of income. This is an extraordinarily high tariff, given that today Barcelona, with the top price in Spain, has consumers paying only 0.4% of domestic expenditure. The modern world has made water cheap, but that does not justify expensive investments like the Rhone project, of the costliest Sanskrit proportions. 0Bibliography AGBAR: (1997) Descripció de l’abastament d’aigua en l’àmbit d’Aigües de Barcelona, Barcelona, 11p. Aqueducte LRC: (1998a) Estudi de viabilitat tècnica, Informe d’evolució. : (1998b) Informació general. Arroyo, F.: (1998) “El consumo de agua en el 2025 será la mitad de lo previsto por la Generalitat,” El País, 19th March. ATLL: (1996) Estudi d’avaluació de la demanda latent i futura d’aigua a l’àmbit de servei de l’empresa pública Aigües Ter-Llobregat, Document de síntesi, 57 p., graphs and maps. : (1997) Memòria 1996, Barcelona, 48 p. : (1998a) Memòria 1997, Barcelona 72 p. : (1998b) Données Hydrològiques des Fleuves Catalans. Barrera, J.: (1998) “El consum d’aigua baixa a Barcelona,” El Periódico, 26th February,

p. 27.

Barrufet, A.: (1995) “Estalvi en la distribució i consum de l’aigua potable” in Institut Català d’Energia, La gestió de l’aigua BRL: (1997) Projet Franco-Espagnol d’Aqueduc Languedoc-Roussillon-Catalogne, Nimes, 13. p. Carrillo, A.: (1998) “El Govern prevé menos déficit de agua, pero no renuncia al Vanguardia, 19th March, Vivir en Barcelona, p. 7

trasvase,” La

Diputació de Barcelona: (1996) La qualitat ecològica del Besòs i del Llobregat Informe 1994-1995, Area de Medi Ambient, Vol. 1, 102 p. :(1997) La qualitat ecològica del Besòs i del Llobregat Informe 1996. Els cabals del riu Congost, Area de Medi Ambient, Vol. 2, 154 p. Elcacho, J.: (1998) “L’àrea metropolitana paga un macrotub que no porta aigua,” Avui, 23rd February, p. 20. Fundació Narcís Monturiol: (1998) L’aigua a Catalonia: Projectes per a una gestió novembre, Universitat Tècnica d’Estiu de Catalonia.

sostenible, Jornada 13

Galofré i Torredemer, A.: (1995) “L’aprofitament de les aigües subterrànies a Catalonia” in Institut Català d’Energia, La gestió de l’aigua. Generalitat de Catalonia: (1995) Pla hidrològic de les conques internes de Catalonia, 280 p. and appendixes.

Gutièrrez, M.: (1998) “Principi d’acord per desencallar el polèmic canal Segarra-Garrigues” Avui, 27th September, p. 27. IC: (1998) “El agua del Ródano costará 61 ptas. más por m3” El País, 20th March, Cataluña, p. 4. Izquierdo Collado, J.: (1997) “ Rapport sur la viabilité technologique de réseaux hydrauliques transeuropéens,” Document de séance, Parlement européen. Mardones, I.G.: (1998) “El Gobierno aprueba el reparto del consumo del agua en las grandes cuencas,” El País, 25th July, p. 19. Mariño, M.A.: (1993) “Water in Agriculture: Options and Proposals for a Better Use,” in AGBAR Symposium. The Water Economy Barcelona, p. 107-132. Pagès Raventós, D.: (1996) Balance hidráulico e hídrico de Catalonia para intentar optimizar los recursos y conseguir la máxima y más econòmica descontaminación del medio ambiente, Real Academia de Ciencias Económicas y Financieras, Barcelona, 230p. Piera i de Ciurana, A.: (1995) “L’aigua no té preu”, Anuari de la Societat Catalana d’Economia, Volume 12, p. 108-123. Prat, N.: (1995) “Varios expertos cuestionan los trasvases para el siglo XXI” El País, 18th October, Cataluña, p.8. : (1997) “Gestió de l’aigua a Catalonia i conservació dels rius com ecosistemes,” in ASAC V jornada sobre la millora de la gestió de l’aigua a Catalonia, Reus, p. 135-158 Prat, N., Munné, A., Solà, C., Bonada, N., Rieradevall, M.: (1998) “Perspectivas de la utilización de los insectos como bioindicadores del estado ecológico de las aguas. Aplicación a rios mediterráneos,” IV congreso argentino de entomología, Mar del Plata. Sharma, K.N.: (1998) “Water-The Fulcrum of Ancient Indian Socio-Religious Traditions in H. Zebidi, ed. Water, A Looming Crisis? UNESCO International Hydrological Programme, p. 471-6. Tocino, I.: (1998) “Tocino aparca el projecte del Roine” El Periódico, 20th March, p. 24. Vergés. J.C.: (1995a) El finançament del cicle integral de l’aigua, PhD University of Barcelona, microfilm. : (1995b) “Qüestions plantejades per a la gestió dels recursos hídrics: El preu de l’aigua” Anuari de la Societat Catalana d’Economia, Volume 12, p. 124-142. : (1998a) Una política económica para el agua, Círculo de Empresarios, Madrid, 142 p. : (1998b) “Spain Backtracks on State Socialism in Water” in addendum to UNESCO International Hydrological Conference, Water. A Looming Crisis? Visa, Ll.: (1998) “Regadíos, la nueva frontera del campo catalán,” El País, 19th May,

Cataluña, p. 6.

THE LRC PROJECT : SUBSIDIARITY AND EQUITY Michel Drain, geographer Research Director CNRS Even though the LRC project raises many different issues, among which a legal one, this assessment focuses on land use and regional planning issues, where geographers are qualified. Two issues are not addressed either, being covered by other studies: the validity of demographic projections, which leads Barcelona to request almost as much extra water as Madrid’s present consumption (!), and the eventual ecological impact. I have only tried to test the rationality of the project vis a vis two important principles of European water policy : first, territorial subsidiarity, and second, equity between regions concerned by the project. I have concluded that the first principle was certainly not met, and that the second was probably not either. But then I did not really cover the second aspect, and I’ll just use it as a way to raise a few preliminary questions to stimulate the reader’s reflection. Preliminary review of water stress in neighbouring regions If we forget national policies and border lines for a while, and consider planning needs at the scale of this part of Europe, the issue is to rank the regions located reasonably close to the lower section of the Rhone in terms of water stress. Since the Durance has been quasi-transferred to the coastal cities, Region Provence-AlpesCôte d’Azur (PACA) is well endowed, in an equilibrate manner. The only issue is the potential impact of increased water transfers on the complex Carmague ecosystem, and the risk of moving the salt point upstream if water is drawn in excess during severe low flow periods. Languedoc-Roussillon is part of the regions having surpluses, thanks to the concession of 75m 3/s by the French government to Bas Rhone Languedoc regional planning company (BRL) until 2035, which is far from being used up. The issue is the increased needs in the future : the region is the poorest in France in terms of per capita income, and one of the least developed in Europe. It could wish to base its growth on water. Catalonia is conversely the most developed region in Spain, and it is one of the 10 richest regions in Europe (per capita income). If this wealth attracts more wealth and immigrants, is planning meant to support a growing dis-equilibrium, with water transfers, or conversely to curb it. Within Catalonia, the regional plan intends to reduce the growth rate of the Barcelona area in favour of the rest of Catalonia. Lastly Midi-Pyrénées is historically and culturally close to Languedoc, since Toulouse was the capital city of all the area. Because of irrigation, it is also closer to the Iberic water problematique than any other French region : it is now regularly water stressed at the end of the summer. The rise of corn production is the major explanatory factor, but small tributaries of the Garonne experience erratic flows part of the year, and the ecosystems protection has given an extra argument to develop an artificialisation: an interconnection system operated by the Compagnie d’aménagement des coteaux de Gascogne (CACG) together with the

flexibilisation of water stocks in the EDF reservoirs upstream, both allow to increase the low summer flows. A controversial project for an extra upstream reservoir is presently postponed not only for its potential impact on the environment, but also for costs exceeding the benefits. Anyway, in the Adour-Garonne basin board, it has first been decided to generalise water metering to all irrigators, with the consent (at last) of the latter. Savings are expected. Now it must be recalled that Toulouse is closer to Montpelier than Barcelona, and that the frontier between the Atlantic basin of the Garonne, and the Mediterranean basin part of the Canal du Midi, the Seuil de Naurouze, is 100m lower than the Perthus pass at the frontier between Roussillon and Catalonia. Region Midi Pyrénées could let irrigators have the local water at cheap rates, and request water from the Rhone for Toulouse, since the transfer would cost less than to Barcelona. This may well be part of the bargaining process in the future, even though Region Languedoc’s president has obtained a sort of agreement from his colleague of MidiPyrénées that they would not request the water. On the east side, there are virtually no Italian urban regions which need water and are at the same distance of the Rhone mouth as Barcelona. Only exception might be Genova, which is at the same distance from the Rhone as Barcelona is, and has to import water from the Pô basin where it is not located. Northern Corsica is not much further, but it has plenty of water. Territorial subsidiarity principle applied to Catalonia The principle is to fetch water into a further basin only if local or regional demand cannot be met locally or adapted. The promoters of the project skilfully consider only the eastern part of Catalonia, which was formerly called Pirineo Oriental, and includes the basins of the coastal rivers within the autonomous region of Catalonia, the rest being part of the Ebro river basin. Hence the name of Cuencas internas, intern catchments. That’s where the population is concentrated, on the littoral : Barcelona, and tourist areas like the Costa Brava. The density on the coastal region reaches 338 inh./km2, which is higher than in Belgium, and consequently pollution problems are serious: available water is less than 1 500 m3/cap/yr. This is considered as critical, at least in a traditional supply-sided vision of water needs. However, the intern basins cover only half of Catalonia. The other half is part of the Ebro basin, and population density is down to 31 inh./km2, with only one large city, Lerida/Lleida. There is far much more available water thanks to several Ebro tributaries flowing south from the Pyrenees, in particular the Segre (the basin of which borders the Llobregat basin). In that part however, irrigation is highly developed and uses enormous amounts of water. The Lerida Province has the largest irrigated surface in Spain, and rice is grown on half of the Ebro delta. Yet it seemed obvious that water should be transferred to Barcelona from the lower course of the Ebro. According to the pre-project of the National Hydrological Plan (1993), 350 Hm3/yr would be transferred North to this city, while even greater quantities would be transferred South. To allow for this large transfers policy, several important upstream reservoirs were planned on the Ebro tributaries, and are almost all finished now. Meanwhile, the projected plan underwent numerous criticisms, until it was discarded after the change of government. For different reasons, irrigators, ecologists and Aragonese regionalists now refuse the very idea of taking more water from the Ebro : among other things, the delta is shrinking due to over-exploitation. And since there is competition between irrigated areas of Catalonia and Aragon, the Catalan government, is reluctant to levy water charges on farmers’ abstractions,

which would make water available to the drinking water use, but at the expense of Catalan irrigated products’ competitivity. Under those circumstances, it is understandable that the water supplier of the Barcelona region, controlled by the Generalitat, looks for another solution. They could eventually recycle, reduce the losses, and rely increasingly on the aquifer of the Llobregat Delta (which is now used only by the private company serving the city of Barcelona, AGBAR, up to 40 Hm3/yr). But they have discarded this solution. The present state of pollution of the Llobregat is indeed a serious obstacle, in financial terms if not technically. They also contend that the natural salt content of the river (it is a rock salt area, with old mines rain-washed to the river) is and will stay above the level of a projected European Directive on chlorides. Mixing it with fresh and clean water seems to them an efficient and economical solution. If one adds the wish to maintain autonomy vis a vis the central government, the Rhone waters seem very attractive for many reasons. Yet this international water transfer requests a treaty between both national governments, which places Catalonia again in the dependence of Madrid. And back at the beginning of 1998, the Spanish minister of the Environment said that the Rhone transfer was not a priority, and that the Ebro would meet the Barcelona needs. Then the president of Murcia region south on the Mediterranean coast claimed that he would fight to obtain ‘his’ Ebro transfer. Anyway the position of the minister might be based on a necessary downward revision of the water needs: ATLL, the regional water supplier, has itself revised the future extra needs from 416 Hm3 to 218 Hm3/yr; clearly, the population is not growing as forecast, and industrial and domestic abstractions are not growing but diminishing. We are then led to explore the hypothesis that Catalonia has sufficient water ressources on its own territory. Water planning on the Segre The last eastern tributary of the Ebro is in fact an international river born in French Cerdagne13. It is quite irregular, with brutal swells reaching 3500 m3/s in Lerida, supporting the idea of regulation by upstream reservoirs. In fact the Segre has long been used for irrigation : in the second half of the XIXth century, the canal de Urgel was dug, and thanks to a simple diversion dam, water allowed to irrigate 70 000 ha. Irrigation steadily developed, in particular under the Autocracy, and after : in 1997, Irrigated cultures represented more than 242,000 ha. But back in 1993, a community of irrigators was formed to use the water from another canal, Segarra-Garrigues, which would transfer water from a big dam to be built on the Segre at Rialb. Enough water would be transferred so that more than 91,000 ha would be irrigated. The new reservoir would also allow to irrigate another 15,000 ha in other parts of western Catalonia. Altogether, the irrigation plan published by the Generalitat in 1999 mentioned, in an official publication, a total of 126,000 ha new irrigation in 16 different locations. This represents an increase above 50 % compared to the 1997 figure, bringing the grand total up to 360,000 ha cultivated in the province of Lerida. The proportion of 35% would be the highest in Spain.

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Cerdagne is a complex water basin border area, since within a few dozen kilometres can be found the springs of Ariège (trib. to Garonne), Aude (coastal mediterranean river), Têt and Tech (flowing east to Perpignan) and Segre. Three small tributaries of the Segre, the Rahur, the Carol and the Llavanera, are also born in France and meet the Segre at or after the border. Altogether, the mean annual amount of water naturally flowing from Cerdagne to Catalonia is at least 6m3/s.

The construction of the Oliana dam, at the end of the second world war, with 92 Hm3 useful capacity, was an essential step in the regulation program, but given the extension of irrigation forecast, it is insufficient to fully securise the downstream irrigation potential. Back in 1964, the project of an integral use of the Segre had already planned another and bigger dam just downtream Oliana, where the Segre quits the mountain area. The decision to build the Rialb “ embalse ” was taken under Franco, and finally approved in 1975. This shows that offering ever more water to irrigation is an old and steadily pushed project. Rialb is the largest reservoir in Catalonia : 600 m wide at the top and 100 m high, 402 Hm3 full capacity, and a water surface larger than 1,500 ha. More than 50 km new roads had to be developed, as well as around 100 km local roads. Particular care has been granted to environmental protection, and at the upstream end a 70 ha sub-reservoir will be maintained at constant level for leisure ; the 300 people concerned by the drowning of the villages of Basella and Tiruana have obtained compensation, and the prominent cultural heritage (romanesque church, dolmen) has been moved out of the drowned area. Obviously, the government wants to avoid the reservoir conflicts that are generalising on the other tributaries of the Ebro. Construction started very quietly in 1994, and was finished in 1999. It is a multipurpose reservoir. According to an arbitrary rule, 10% of the projected volume of water will be reserved for compensations or ecosystem needs. This leaves about 1000 Hm3 to split between various uses : a very precise amount of 16.85 Hm3 for water supplies in part of Lerida province is given. The rest is vague : 400 Hm3 would be reserved for the Urgel canal, while 225 Hm3 would go to the Segarra-Garrigues, 18 Hm3 to compensate displaced population with irrigation water, and less than 10 Hm3 for other small local concessions. This would leave about 330 Hm3 for a 100 GWH hydroelectricity production per year. Transferring water to Barcelona had been part of the initial justification of the project, since it needs only a small aqueduct. But nobody mentioned this anymore when Barcelona experienced a risk of shortage at the beginning of the 90’s. With 59% of the total, vs only 1.5% for drinking water supplies, agriculture takes the lion’s share. However there is something unclear : in the local press, Rialb is only intended to securise existing irrigation, and to develop 4 000 new hectares with a particularly high consumption of 8,900 m3/ha/yr guaranteed at 90%. Yet, even on this basis, new irrigation would only take 36 Hm3/yr, while the compensation of the so-called structural deficit of existing irrigation is assessed by the Ebro confederacion Hidrografica at 50 Hm3/yr. All this is indeed very far from the figure of 650 Hm3 given for future irrigation. The estimates of water flows in the Ebro and its tributaries by the same confederation are also quite vague. From various contacts and from information provided by El País at the end of 1999, one could understand that the Ebro confederation paid for the Rialb reservoir, but does not want to pay for the Segarra-Garrigues transfer, without which the reservoir is almost useless. But Catalonia does not want to pay for the transfer either, because the value of water in irrigation is too low. The Generalitat then hopes that the central government in Madrid will subsidise the transfer, and the Madrid newspaper even mentioned that the Catalan autonomists had accepted to support the Partido Popular government’s law creating water markets (which could not pass without their support in a context of radical hostility of the socialists) in exchange of a 50% subsidy of the Segarra-Garrigues transfer by the government 14 ! However, now that general elections have given a full majority to the Partido Popular, Catalans can 14

We have translated a few articles published by El País on these water markets, and placed them after the Alcain Martinez contribution on water law in Spain.

really fear that the promise won’t be kept, and they have already started reconsidering their whole strategy : they started an analysis of the financial balance if they replaced the Rhone transfer by a transfer from Rialb on the Segre or from the other Catalan tributaries of the Ebro. In any case, indeed, more transparency would be needed to check this information, and if anything, water markets in Spain would certainly allow cities to buy the water needed from the new irrigation areas ... Irrigation at stake Irrigation is less productive in inland Spain than on the Mediterranean coast. However, this does not hold for the central part of Lerida province, where farms are small (6.5 ha average), and highly productive. Small broken down agriculture might explain as well as climate the type of cultures developed and the high water input, in a context where water is almost given to the farmers (conversely to groundwater which has to be pumped, and is therefore used more sparsely). Fruit production dominates, with good productivity : peaches, apples (25 t/ha), pears (16 t/ha) and alfalfa (6 t/ha). But cattle breeding is very important, in particular pig farms with the equivalent of 525 000 cattle units according to the agricultural census of 1989. Intensive pig farms bring between a third and half of the total final output. What is the prospect for agriculture ? Fruit crops do not get much subsidies from the European Union CAP, so that they might appear sustainable. However, one should recall that european costs are generally higher than those of the world market, and that the U.S, followed by the Cairns group, puts the pressure within world trading arrangements on lowering agriculture prices. Besides, European fiscal and social harmonisation measures will increase the fragility of fruit crops which need an underpaid picking manpower to remain competitive. In this respect, Lerida irrigation is in an intermediate position between the numerous ones in the inland part of Spain, which should shortly be marginalised, and the coastal areas where “ counter season ” crops should keep a long term profitability. The Lerida area also undergoes a frequently denounced rural exodus. Seasonal manpower is increasingly composed of semiillegal Moroccans. The same agricultural census of 1989 estimated a 7.8 workers units per ha, i.e. 16 000 Worker units. This is why, despite its irrationality, the solution to increase the water available for agriculture gets particular political support, even in industrial Catalonia. It is significant that local opinion and the media make the maintained irrigation a taboo issue. It is presented as the mean to counter the desertification trends, and to revert the disequilibrium with the Barcelona area. Thus, the opposition to the Segre transfers in general is as strong as is the Aragonese opposition about the Ebro transfers. Obviously, all the water which is not taken by such a priority use as drinking water is liberated for other and lower value uses, whatever is sworn by the Rhone aqueduct promoters when they guarantee that their water will exclusively serve urban needs. There are obviously internal political reasons for the Generalitat’s reluctance to take a fraction of the Segre flow for Barcelona; even if this is only a small fraction, which would be needed only under serious drought circumstances, and with due compensation to the farmers. But these internal political struggles should not interfere with European-scale planning policies. Indeed, in the spirit of the Framework Directive in preparation, French representatives of the Agence de l’Eau Rhone-Mediterranean-Corsica, which is in charge of the Cerdagne part of

the Segre, should be skillfully used as mediators in a bottom-up type of policy : bargaining the existing water between types of uses and territories, through a more transparent and participatory decision making process, at the basin-regional level, would lead to more efficient investments, even though they are less fancy for regional political leaders on both sides of the border. Bibliography Michel Drain (ed.) 1996: “ Les conflits pour l’eau en Europe méditerranéenne ”, issue n° 36 of a geography periodical called Espace Rural, University Paul Valery publications service, BP 5043, F34032- Montpellier cedex 1 Michel Drain (ed.) 1998: “Régulation de l’eau en milieu méditerranéen, risques et tensions”, Territoires en mutation, revue de l’UPRES-A 5045 du CNRS, n°3, March (same address).

WATER RIGHTS CONCESSIONS IN THE 1985 LAW IN SPAIN Esperanza Alcaín Martinez Professor of civil Law University of Granada15. In order to answer the questions raised by our European colleagues, this paper gives a quick presentation of the legal regime of administrative concessions regulating water abstractions under Spanish law. Various possibilities for government services to modify a concession right are under particular focus. Under Spanish law, concessions are limited in time and subject to review Since the 1985 Water Law (LA, ley de aguas)16, private use of the Hydraulic Public Domain is possible through administrative concessions17 with the main following characteristics : a) concessions are only granted for limited periods of time, with a maximum duration of 75 years (art. 57.4 LA). There are no perpetual concessions. Concessions may be extended only once, for a maximum 10 years period, in one specific case : when it is absolutely necessary for the normal benefit of the concession to make investments with a cost recovery time frame incompatible with the remaining time until concession expiration (art. 57.6 LA, art.154 RDPH). It was however mentioned for Doctrinal discussion, that the assumption of “ indefinite prolongation ” has been introduced in article 51.3 of LA : when final destination of water concessions is either irrigation or water supply, the concession holder may be granted a new one with the same water use and destination either within the five last years of concession validity or as long as demand follows legal procedures defined in the extinction declaration file. The demand file will be processed if compatible with the National Hydrological Plan. b) Concessions are granted in the perspective of a co-ordinated rational exploitation of ground and surface water resources (art. 57.2 LA, art. 97.1 RDPH). Water use rights follow the previsions of the Hydrological Plans (art. 57.2 LA, art. 97.1 RDPH). The under Directorate for Hydrological Planning indicated that there is no pre established date for approval of the National Hydrological Plan (PHN). In the near future, a Water White Paper will be published with updated directives and guidelines of the Plan. c) The concession title does not warrant the permanent availability of granted flows (art. 57.2, LA). Consequently, government cannot be held responsible for a temporary flow reduction . d) Water is conceded for specific uses mentioned in the concession title, which cannot be changed for any other uses (art. 59.2 LA, art. 99 RDPH).

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translated into English by Sophie Cambon-Grau and Bernard Barraqué. The major texts defining water rights in Spain are : the 1985 Water Law of august 2nd (LA) ; the Rule on Hydraulic Public Domain approved by the Royal Decree n°849 of April 11th 1986, developing titles I, IV, V and VII of the LA (RDPH), the Rule of Water Public Administration and of Hydrological Planning approved by Royal Decree n°927 of July 29th 1988, developing titles II and III of the LA (RAPPH). 17 Articles 57 to 72 of the LA and articles 93 and 197 of the RDPH. 16

e) No new concessions can impair the rights of third parties (Art. 59.1, LA). Any existing right and interest is warranted before any new concession is granted. Various possibilities to modify ongoing concessions The above described legal frame regulates the allocation of private uses of the hydraulic public domain under Spanish Law. Primarily, administrative concession is granted for a predetermined use registered in the concession act : it is expected that the final destination and adequate use of water are respected. However, the water law itself offers several ways of modifying granted concessions. Public administration has been given extensive powers to promote an efficient water resources management, mainly through 3 legal procedures : 1. Renewal : If water has been conceded for irrigation or water supply uses, the concession holder can get a new one with the same use and destination (art. 51.3, LA and art. 89.3, RDPH). There are a few exceptions to this rule : if the water concession for irrigation is under the regime of public service to individuals or companies, the holders of the irrigated surface will be the only ones entitled to ask for a new concession (art. 60.3, LA and art. 100.3, RDPH) ; if the concession concerns a public water supply service of rural or urban local authorities but operated indirectly, only will local authorities be entitled to ask for a new concession (art. 125.4, RDPH). (Procedure : art. 140, 142 and 89.3, RDPH). 2. Modification of ongoing concessions : Since it is not possible to allocate conceded water to other uses or, in case of irrigation, to other fields, then consequently, the Law includes the possibility of changing the concession content (same title but with some different characteristics). Prior to modification, administrative consent of the body in charge is required (art. 62, LA), so as to make sure that a substantial change in concession content respects administrative rules concerning publicity and fair competition, as well as good resource management criteria. The content change can be either : • subjective : in this case, water use will be partially of totally transmitted ; when the concession serves a public service, administrative licensing will be requested ; in other cases, a guarantee will be required and provided for the purpose of administrative monitoring and control (art. 61 LA and art. 103 RDPH), or • objective : in this case, the content or purpose of the concession is modified. The modification process is described in RDPH depending if characteristics changed are key ones (holder identity, maximum flow, average permanent abstracted flow, nature of the water resource and intake point, purpose of derivation, irrigated surfaces, and section of river used for power generation -art. 144, 1 and 2 RDPH-) or secondary ones (not listed). The various regulatory regimes are described in art 141 to 155 RDPH. 3. Concession revision : Art. 63 of law n°9 of January 15th 1996 on urgent, exceptional and extraordinary water supply measures to take in case of persistent drought, implies three possibilities of concession revision : • when conditions for granting the concession can be proved to have changed ; • under conditions beyond possible regulation (fuerza mayor) upon request by the concession holder ; • when compliance to hydrological plans is needed.

For instance, art. 2 states that “ concessions granted for irrigation or water supply can be reviewed if concession goals can be met with a lesser water volume, or when the improvement of technologies generates water resources savings ”. The aim of concession revision (as defined in art. 156 to 160 RDPH) is to end or modify concessions. If the revision was motivated by compliance to hydrological plans, the concession holder will receive a compensation for the corresponding prejudice, which was not the case under concession renewal or modification. The level of compensations is defined by the general regulations on forced expropriations (art. 63.3 LA). Compliance to hydrological plans is the only circumstance entailing compensation. However the first possibility a) offers the administration many possibilities for revision without compensation, in all instances when “conditions for concession delivery have been clearly modified ”. Art. 156.2 RDPH is very precise on the matter “ when objective circumstances which based the decision to grant the concession are modified in a way that significantly affects the capacity of meeting the concession goals”. Expropriation In addition to the possibilities to modify or end a concession, the administration also can expropriate as stated in several articles18. 1- When Government takes extraordinary measures in case of exceptional situations The Law stipulates that under extreme drought conditions, in case of severe overuse of aquifers, and in case of extreme necessity or emergency, or in any other extraordinary or exceptional situations, the government may adopt all necessary measures regarding the use of the Public Hydraulic Domain to solve the above mentioned situations, even if it affects granted concessions. The measures adopted will be known in a decree approved by the Council of ministers upon advice of the River basin authority (art. 56.1 LA). Their approval will imply the “ declaration of public utility ” of works, drilling operations and studies necessary for their implementation consequently of temporary occupation and of forced expropriation of goods and rights and consequently of urgent necessity of this occupation (art. 56.2 LA). 2- When a water use has precedence over the use of a concession Any concession is liable to forced expropriation (as described in the general corresponding legislation) for the sake of another use that has been given a higher order of priority in the Hydrologic Plan of the basin, or, if not applicable, in paragraph 2 of article 58 LA. Priority to drinking water supply The order of priorities defined in the law is as follows : drinking water supply comes first and includes the volume of water necessary for all industries with low water consumption, located in population centres and connected to public supply ; irrigation and agricultural uses come 18

Art. 53 of LA acknowledges that a change in flows may occur when defining the exploitation regime of surface reservoirs and ground water sources ; when the change is beneficial to some uses at the expense of other uses, beneficiaries will have to offer compensation. The basin authority will fix the amount due if the parties cannot reach an agreement. A specialist has considered the process as being an expropriation even if compensation is not given by the administration but by beneficiaries instead. That is why I prefer to talk about a case that implies a responsibility vis a vis damage and prejudice caused rather than a true forced expropriation procedure.

second ; power generation comes third, followed by other industrial uses, aquaculture, recreational uses, navigation and other water abstractions. The Law clearly gives absolute priority to the abstractions, usually made by municipalities, for public drinking water supply : it is acknowledged, with reference to doctrine and jurisprudence, that this priority is given regardless of the nature and size of the “ population group ”, as long as supply is considered “ normal ”19. It was argued that this juridical principle should have been mitigated to promote a more rational use of resources : some uses included in the so called “ population water supply ” should not be granted absolute priority (for instance street cleaning and sport uses). Review of the most significant Supreme Court (STS) cases since 1985 helps clarify the implementation of the priority given to public water supply : • Priority applies when several demands compete (STS 26-5-1997, R.A. 4397). In other words “ thanks to priority given to water abstractions for public supply over irrigation and agricultural uses, municipalities can initiate the expropriation procedure by government, but cannot prevent inscription of a concession demand for irrigation even if this latter use does not prevail (STS 27-5-1997 R.A. 4446). Priority also applies in case of concession modification (STS 23-4-1993 R.A. 2753). ” • “ Legal priorities cannot be maintained in case of emergency if they go against optimal uses of water resources under scarcity conditions and if they cause situations that need correction through an equitable and solidary distribution of prejudices caused by the drought between all affected sectors. For instance, the government can take the liberty of reducing or suppress supply tariffs and abstraction levies designed in drought conditions (TS 16-111993, R.A. 9060). ” • In most cases, expropriation is presented as the solution to situations in which there is a will to alter an abstraction right. “ The Community cannot authorise the supply of water outside the irrigation zone or for any other uses without authorisation of the Ministry of Public Works ; if the water is needed for public water supply which is granted a clear priority, it will be possible to expropriate the necessary volume of water, not from another concession granted for public supply but from concessions for irrigation uses ” (STS 2711-1989, R.A. 8329). In this case, the word Community refers to an irrigation association , as defined in the law. • A water use having precedence cannot take the water of another use until this latter one has not been expropriated. There are instances, however, when a municipality, faced to growing water demand of its population, has taken water granted to irrigators. In such cases, injunctive relief can be asked to the administration. But the Supreme Court itself states that the best solution consists of expropriating the water flows required by public interest (STS 24-3-1988 R.A. 2432). • The financial compensation will be paid by the concession beneficiary even when it is a public service, as described in article 121.2 of the law on Forced Expropriation (STS 17-71987 R.A. 7519). Inter-basin transfers 19

Local authorities are not competent in the management of the hydraulic public domain ; responsibilities in that field belongs either to the Autonomous Communities or to the State, depending on the characteristics (intra or extra territorial) of the hydrographic basins. However, municipal responsibility for water supply delivery may indirectly affect urban management and administrative policy of water supply and waste water collection.

Water transfers from one hydrographic basin to another directly impacts water supply conditions (even though it serves agricultural interests). The 1985 law does not cover the issue of water transfers in general, which is only mentioned in article 43.1 c) stating that the National Hydrological Plan will be approved by law and will necessarily include forecast and conditions of water resources transfers between territories under the jurisdiction of several Basin Hydrological Plans. For each planned transfer will be set the annual volume, as well as the hydrological conditions under which that volume can be modified temporarily (art. 93 RAPPH). Article 43 indicates that a law will not be required when water resources are transferred within the same basin, in other words when only one hydrographic confederation is involved (e.g. transferring water from a tributary of the Ebro to another tributary ; conversely, transferring water from a tributary of the Ebro to Barcelona, which is in another Confederacion Hidrografica, requests a law).

A market of water rights ? Another possible solution still open to discussion, in absence of existing rules, would be the creation of water markets : water rights holders could sell waters under concession to third parties, making it impossible to perpetuate the nature of water usage as established by the water law. There would be administrative controls (notification, contracts recording, possibility offered to the administration to make attempts and stop them). More precisely, if contracts of “ water sales ” were authorised only when beneficial to priority uses, public water supply could only sell them to other population centres. Conversely, municipalities and water suppliers in general could buy them from any other user. This option has flexibility advantages compared to expropriation which is the most commonly used solution as mentioned earlier. Answers to questions from our European colleagues This analysis can be summarised in eight answers : 1.- Administrative concessions are now granted only for a limited period of time (maximum 75 years), and for a pre-determined use registered in the concession act. 2.- Administration has various possibilities to modify or to suppress granted concessions through several legal means : renewal, modification, revision and expropriation, with prior analysis of the effects of each mean on the concession holders and on the content of the granted concession. 3.- The 1985 water law grants absolute priority to abstraction of water for drinking, and public supplies, and this article has been the legal ground for many cases of expropriation of prior concessions, in particular among those for irrigation. 4.- In these cases, Court decision did not indicate the amount of damages or compensation for the expropriation, which is fixed by the administration according to general existing rules of expropriation (art. 166 RDPH). 5.- However, a concession holder whose title is modified, is entitled to damages only in case of compulsory purchase, or revision for the sake of complying with the Hydrological Plans ( Water law, art. 63.3). 6.- It is the Basin Authority which has regulatory power on the concessions in the Public hydraulic domain (i.e. all water resources since 1985), except when structures or procedures of general interest of the State are involved ; in which case, it is the ministry of Development (exministry of Public Works) which has competence. If a concession has been granted in a basin entirely located within an Autonomous Region (e.g. intern basins of Catalonia, Conques internes de Catalonia), regulation is made by the services of the Region ; in any other case, the State services are competent. 7.- the case of water supply of the Balearic islands by water shipped from the Ebro is an illustrative example, and the corresponding law n°34/1994 of December 19 is annexed. 8.- Lastly, one must recall that the concessions system must be reviewed and approved by the National Hydrological Plan. Nota Bene by Michel Drain and Bernard Barraqué : the National Hydrological Plan, presented as a “ pre project ” in 1993 is dead born. A white paper was meant to replace it but was likely to be a simple puzzle of basin plans. When published in February 1999, it has apparently boosted polemics. Then the government proposed to develop the economic value of water. The idea of developing either a market or abstractions taxes with compensations to water savers was on its way, despite opposition from the socialists, at the time Ms Martinez’s paper was written in

1998. The law creating water markets in Spain was voted at the end of November 1999. Articles in El País have been summarised below to update the information.

Annex Decree-Law of May 22nd 1992 on water supply of urban centres in Palma di Majorca Bay. Argument Article 10 of the Royal Decree-Law n°3/1992 of may 22nd, according to which all urgent measures are decided to solve the consequences of droughts, declares that the water supply works of the area of Palma di Majorca Bay meet, among others, involve general interest. Today the water main connecting the Llubi-Muro water table to the Bay has been achieved. The sea water desalination unit and the water main connecting Sa Costera-Soller to the bay are under construction. Undoubtedly, when they will operate, the new water facilities will solve water supply problems experienced by the Palma Bay area. Presently however, the water supply conditions that are precarious under normal hydrological conditions are becoming extremely serious because of the long drought. The low level of ground water stocks may endanger in the short run a sufficient water supply of the population in the Bay area. Considering the situation and the extraordinary and urgent needs that go along with it, immediate specific measures must be adopted to face the serious water supply deficit : they should last until water stocks improve, either through better hydrological conditions or, if it is not the case, through operation of the new water facilities. Co-ordination of the needed measures will require a Royal Decree-Law, first because extraordinary and urgent circumstances imposes it as stated in art. 86 of Spanish Constitution, and second because these measures would affect and modify law 18/1981 of July 1st on procedures regarding water in Tarragona. One solution, temporary by its nature, would offer good feasibility conditions and a good respect of quality and quantity of necessary flows : it would consist of using water flows of the Ebro delta System, as described in law 18/1981, that have not been yet conceded to Tarragona Consortium but that would be transported and treated in the consortium water facilities and then shipped to Majorca Island. Practical use of these flows will need to urgently build a few facilities in Tarragona and Majorca : the texts underlying this water use are 1° collaboration convention of December 27th 1985 on hydraulic works of Tarragona , co-signed by the ex-Ministry of Public Works and Housing, and by Catalonia Generalitat ; 2° convention of October 28th 1986 on hydraulic works, co-signed by the Ministry of Public Works, of Transports and of the Environment, and by the Autonomous Community of Balearic Islands ; 3° convention on Majorca’s situation of march 26th 1994 on water supply of urban centres of Palma di Majorca Bay and other topics, co-signed by the Ministry of Public Works, of Transports and of the Environment, and by the Autonomous Community of Balearic Islands. Article 1. 1. Authorises the use of waters abstracted through Tarragona Waters facilities (as specified in law 18/1981 of July 1st) to provide water supply to populations of the area of Palma di Majorca Bay and Majorca Island. 2. The maximum annual volume that can be delivered has been limited at 10 Hm3 with a maximum 35.000 m3 per day. The flows authorised by this law will be added to those granted in the concession to the Tarragona Waters Consortium as agreed in the above mentioned 18/1981 law. However, the sum of the two flows will never and under any circumstance

exceed 4 m3/s ; moreover, the flows derived to Majorca Island shall not affect conditions and terms of the concession presently granted to Tarrogona Waters Consortium and of concessions that the consortium may hold in the future. 3. Expiration date for the authorisation is December 31st 1998. Article 2. Flows authorised by the previous article will be exclusively used with the destinations and territorial limits fixed by the same law. Article 3. 1. Abstracted flows will be paid by the user at the maximum supply rate presently charged by the Tarragona Waters Consortium. This will not include bonus or taxes on these rates that are presently charged or will be charged by Catalonia Generalitat to cities located on the territory of this autonomous Community. In all instances, the rate will include the value of the tax and of its increase necessary to share the use of existing facilities as mentioned in art. 3 of the law 18/1981. The tax will serve goals defined in §2 of art. 3 and will be managed by the body presently in charge. 2. All shipping expenses necessary to supply the populations of Palma di Majorca Bay as described in the lax will be supported by the supply beneficiaries. Article 4. 1. The works necessary for the effective derivation of flows and population supply authorised by the law will be considered as rescue operations described in art. 27 of the text annexed to the law on State Contracts and approved by the decree n°932/1965 of April 8th. Financial costs of the works will be covered by the Ministry of Public Works, of Transport and of the Environment and will have to comply with conditions of art. 106 if water Law n°29/1985 of nd august 2 and of art. 296 and following articles of Regulation on the Public Hydraulic Domain approved by the Royal Decree 849/1986 of April 11th. 2. All the necessary works will involve procedures of 'public utility' (eminent domain) with the goals mentioned in articles 9, 10, and 11 of the law on forced expropriation of December 16th 1954. 3. All the works serving the implementation of the law will comply with conditions defined in workable collaboration conventions either approved or to be approved in the future between the Ministry of Public Works, of Transport and of the Environment and Autonomous Communities of the Balearic Islands and of Catalonia. 0Additional disposition n° 1 The control of water derivation organised by the law will be supported by the Hydrographic Confederation of Ebro. 1Additional disposition n° 2 The delay for authorisation mentioned in art. 1, §3, depends upon the beginning of full operation of the Palma di Majorca Bay’s desalination unit and of water transfers from Sa Costera and Soller to the Bay. The authorisation will end after a maximum 30 days following facilities full operation. 2Additional disposition n° 3 The Ministry of Public Works, of Transport and of the Environment, within its competence will fix harbour taxes associated to shipping the water supply of urban populations of Palma di Majorca Bay.

3Final disposition n° 1 The Ministry of Public Works, of Transport and of the Environment, within its competence will edict the norms necessary to the operation of the transfer and supply systems promoted by the law. 4Final disposition n°2 The present Law will apply the very day of its publication in the “ State Official Journal ”.

NEW LAW OPENS THE WAY TO WATER EXCHANGES BETWEEN RIGHTS HOLDERS A new rule obliges to install individual metering of all types of abstractions Inmaculada G. Mardones El País, Madrid, 26-11-99 The water law reform, on which the Partido popular (PP) has bet no less than winning the elections, has received final approval from the Parliament, four months before the closure of the legislature. Supported by the Catalan and Basque nationalists, the Government has not succeeded to pull water markets further, but opens the way to a free trade of concession rights, with some exceptions, like in case of negative impact on the conservation of aquatic ecosystems, and the prohibition to sell water to consumers who have a lower priority right of use than the vendor. Supporters of a free water market without conditions haven’t won the battle, but they see with optimism an open crack to eliminate the rigidity that the 1985 water law of the Socialists had established in the regulation of concessions to use or consume water. This crack is wide enough for the Socialists to have announced as soon as yesterday, through their speaker Victor Morlán, that if they win next march, they’ll change this text approved by Congress. The major dissent of the Socialists with IU (communists), on the one hand, and with the Government, on the other, focuses on the legalisation of water sales. The approved reform sets that “ concession holders of any private right to use water can temporarily transfer all or part thereof, to another concession holder with priority rank equal or higher (between irrigators, or from irrigation to urban water supply, for instance), with prior administrative licence ”. This market remains expressly closed to water users holding a concession to use water without properly consuming it, as is the case with hydroelectricity. This exclusion was introduced in the draft prepared by the Ministry of the Environment, when the opposition, and the farmers and ecologists organisations, claimed that if it didn’t do so, electricity companies, which hold the rights on water stored in the largest reservoirs in Spain, would end up with full control on water. Private persons will be free to fix the sale price. From the moment they sign the contract, they have 15 days to hand a copy to the irrigators’ community which they belong to, and to the

corresponding river basin authority (confederacion hidrografica). The contract will be valid if the confederacion does not object within one month, in the case of the first transfer considered, and two months for the next proposals. In case authorities do not allow a contract, they’ll have to motivate their refusal within the above mentioned deadlines, whether it affects negatively the basin’s water resources, third parties’ rights, or minimal ecological flows. In no case will this prohibition give any right to those affected to damages. Like in the auctions on cultural goods, basin authorities have precedence in the purchasing right on the volumes set for sale, and can withhold them from their private use. Although the law says the price of the exchange will be freely fixed between the contractors, and will be made explicit in the contract, it also says that “ a maximum level can be fixed ”. Benigno Blanco, secretary of State to coasts and water, has finally set this maximum around 60 Ptas/ m3 (2.4 FF, or 0.36 Euros), which is the price reached by water in the black market in the South East. Thanks to an initiative of the opposition, the law allows for the institution of water banks, or “ centres for water rights exchanges ”, under approval by the Council of Ministers. This has originally been experienced in California during the severe droughts in the 1980’s and allowed for the sale of water rights by farmers to cities so that the latter did not suffer restrictions, through the mediation of water authorities. In the Spanish case, only would the confederaciones (water authorities) be authorised to make public purchase offers (in Spanish OPA) of water rights so as to sell them later to other users “ for the price that this very organism has offered ”. The autonomous regions can request the creation of water banks to take care of the needs in their own territory. The water law reform is marked by the serious supply shortages which have affected more than eleven million people during the last drought. With this antecedent, and with the lack of information about where and how much water is consumed, the law sets a general obligation to meter abstractions, either with official meters as those in use for domestic supply, or through the fixation of standard consumption for irrigated lands. Meters will also have to be installed in industries and municipalities which discharge waste water in public domain rivers. Even private ponds will be subject to control I.G.M. Madrid, 26-11-99 The Senate has almost left no trace of its contribution to the new water law. It has only included four amendments pushed by the Socialists and the Communists. One of them refers to the subjection of ponds located on private land to public environmental control. The owners of the lands on which they are located can use their water freely, “ without prejudice to the corresponding environmental legislation ”. Which means that the Autonomous region which is competent on this land, and the confederacion, will visit to control the aquatic environment, which until now they had escaped from doing.

The Senate also has reinforced the protection of aquatic ecosystems and wetlands, and has extended from 4 to 5 years the duration of discharge permits. Other salient aspects of the new water law are the following : • free desalination. Any physical or moral person can install sea water desalination plants, provided they obtain the corresponding residuals discharge authorisation, and they meet the quality standards. This activity was previously restricted. • Autonomous Communities : all the affairs treated by the Confederaciones hidrograficas, will be subjected to preliminary information of the autonomous regions. Conversely, these will give a prior advice on the regional plans for land-use, town planning, natural areas, fishing and irrigation (Senate suppressed “ within 2 months ”). • Public works of general interest (public utility or eminent domain) : against the opposition’s criteria, the Government can include in this category works which are not officialised by law, like those promoted by an autonomous region or in which it has interest. Opposition believes that a way is thus open to political patronising. • Irrigation communities : all the users of the same aquifer remain obliged to constitute an irrigators’ community, which will determine its limits and the self-management system for the shared use of groundwater. • Deadlines : the Hydraulic Administration gives itself more time than in ordinary procedures to resolve affairs : 18 months for the concessions of the public hydraulic domain ; 6 for the uses of its environments, and 12 to decide sanctions. • Single act : the law compels the Government to unify within one year the “ turbulent ” legislation on water. PP failed to reach a compromise with the socialists on the law contents I.G.M. Madrid, 26-11-99 [ ... ] The socialists never would accept that the exchange of water rights could be liberalised, arguing that the resource is a public good and cannot be commercialised. The richer would monopolise the concessions. Conversely, the Government maintains that liberalising is the only way to correctly allocate. Then the only thing PP could do is get the backing of the Catalan nationalists of CiU. These had proposed an amendment through which the Autonomous regions having full competence on water (Catalonia, Galicia, Baleares and Canarias, i.e. those including completely a confederacion hidr.) could set the water abstraction and discharge levies first, and water consumers would not have to pay any national levy ; or at least the total would not exceed the national levy raised in the other Autonomias. Now Catalan nationalists sources say that this amendment was initially accepted by the Government, but finally removed for the promise of granting it in a future and separate protocol ; same source alleged that the deal was struck when the Government decided to finance an important part of the Canal Garriga-Noguera, which Catalonia wants so as to

convert 50 000 ha of dry farm land into irrigation in the sub basin left of the Ebro. The Region had fought many years to get this work declared of general interest. The water of all (opinion of the periodical, 27-11-99). […] The new law does not question the public domain character of water. Its starts from that principle to introduce several mechanisms to facilitate access to all, in equal terms and without privileges. The most innovative, and altogether controversial, is to have set up a regulated water market allowing to temporarily sell the concession rights between water users. This exchange of excess water between private persons, subject to administrative review, has suffered the opposition of the socialists, who have announced its suppression if they win the next elections. From then on there exists a risk that the clever ones try to make a profit under the protection of an administrative concession ; however, in its principle, a measure contributing to make water transfers easier in drought periods and to avoid its waste seems reasonable. In any case, excluding from this market hydroelectric companies, owners of the rights on the large reservoirs, is a success of the opposition against the initial proposals of the Government. From the opposition also comes the idea, accepted by the majority, to facilitate the creation of water banks or “ centres for water use rights exchanges ”, subject to administrative licence, to solve or alleviate water supply problems in times of drought […]. The new law includes other positive aspects, like the obligation to install individual meters on all types of uses, and picks up the environmental worries of society, with a greater implementation of the Polluter-pays principle. However, it is understood that the success of the law will depend on the capacity of public authorities to have it enforced, and to avoid that the cracks open through this water liberalisation pave the way for intrigues and corruption.